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75.

S.D. UNIFORM PROD. CODE §2-801 (1975).

76.

TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. §37A.

77.
78.
79.
80.

UTAH CODE ANN. §75-2-801 (1977).
See, e.g., Church v. Church, 80 Vt. 228, 67 A. 549 (1907).
Bradley v. State, 100 N.H. 232, 235, 123 A.2d 148, 151 (1956).
VA. CODE §64.1.188-.1.192 (1950) provides few answers outside of the timing require-

ments and allowance of intestate share disclaimers; thus, common law rules should govern.
81. VA. CODE §64.1.189 (1950) provides that disclaimers must be made within nine months
after transfer, ascertainment or indefeasible vesting.
82.

WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §11.86.020.

83. Wis. STAT. ANN. §852.13 (West 1971). This statute provides few answers; thus, common
law rules should govern.
84. Wis. STAT. ANN. §852.13 (West 1971) provides that disclaimers must be made within
six months of death, subject to extension for cause by a state court.
85. W. VA. CODE §42-4-3 (1976).

86. W. VA. CODE §42-4-3 (1976) provides that disclaimers must be made within six months
following submittance of the will, or if contested following the contest, or if no will following
death.
87. See Butcher v. Butcher, 566 P.2d 587 (Wyo. 1977).
88. See note 9 supra.

REVENUE RULING 69-74: AN ADMINISTRATIVE REVERSAL OF
BURNET V. LOGAN AND THE GASH EQUIVALENCE DOCTRINE
INTRODUCION

Until the issuance of Revenue Ruling 69-74, the transferor-annuitant who
transferred property in a private annuity transaction was guaranteed very
favorable income tax treatment. The primary factor that enabled the transferor to obtain this treatment was the Service's recognition of the applicability
of the "open transaction" doctrine of Burnet v. Logan. Revenue Ruling 239,
issued in 1953, determined that taxability of each annuity payment should
depend ultimately upon the relevant annuity statute; accordingly, under section 72 of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code, annuity payments were apportioned
into the excluded portion and the non-excluded or interest portion. A portion
of each payment was taxed as ordinary income, while the remainder of the
payment was received tax free as a return of capital until the adjusted basis of
the transferred property was recovered. The annuitant then reported the excluded portion of each payment as capital gain (assuming a capital asset was
transferred) until the total capital gain reported equalled the difference between the fair market value and the adjusted basis of the transferred property
at the time of transfer. It was generally thought that the excluded portion no
longer represented gain and, reverting back to pure annuity status, would be
received tax free.
Under Revenue Ruling 69-74 each payment is separated into three elements.
The interest portion is taxed as ordinary income for the remainder of the
transferor's life. A second portion represents a pro rata allocation over the
expected life of the annuity of the total capital gain recognized. It is computed
by subtracting the adjusted basis of the transferred property from the present
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value of the annuity promise and dividing by the life expectancy of the
annuitant. After the entire capital gain is recognized, this portion becomes
taxable as ordinary income for the remainder of the annuitant's life. The
final portion is the balance of the annuity payment and is received tax free for
the entire life of the annuitant.
Revenue Ruling 69-74, without any legislative or case authority, has substantially altered the former method of taxing private annuities, This paper
analyzes the differences between the various methods for taxing private annuities and the theoretical justification for the substantial break with precedent
that 69-74 represents.
BACKGROUND - SECTION

72 AND BURNET V. LOGAN

In addition to the treatment afforded to annuities under federal estate tax
laws,' specific sections concerning such contracts have existed since the enactment of the first income tax law in 1913. The income tax consequences to the
annuitant have always contained an exemption feature with respect to the
payments made under the contract, such exemptions being mandated by "recovery of cost" notions.
The Revenue Act of 1913 stated that payments, "made by or credited to the
insured, on life insurance, endowment, or annuity contracts, upon the return
thereof to the insured at the maturity of the term mentioned in the contract,
or upon the surrender of the contract, shall not be included as income." 2 The
Revenue Act of 1916 provided an exclusion for "the amount received by the
insured, as a return of premium or premiums paid by him ... ."3 This provision was retained in the four revenue acts enacted between 1916 and 1926. 4
The regulations, rulings, and cases under these acts exhibited schizophrenic
treatment on the issue of whether the clause exempted payments until their cost
was recouped, or directed that each payment be allocated to income and capital
with only the capital portion being excluded from gross income.5 It was not
1.

I.R.C.

§2039.

2. Revenue Act of 1915, Pub. L. No. 16, §11 (B), 58 Stat. 167 (1915) (emphasis added).
3. Revenue Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 271, tit. I, §4, 39 Stat. 758 (1916).
4. Revenue Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 50, tit. XII, §1200, 40 Stat. 829 (1917); Revenue Act
of 1919, Pub. L. No. 254, tit. I, §213(b)(2), 40 Stat. 1065 (1919); Revenue Act of 1921, Pub. L.
No. 98, tit. II, §215(b)(2), 42 Stat. 238 (1921); Revenue Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 176, tit. II,
§213(b)(2), 43 Stat. 268 (1924).
5. See, e.g., T.D. 2090, 16 TRFAS. DEc. INT. REV. 259, 260-61 (1914), a ruling which was apparently reversed by T.D. 2152, 17 TRaAS. DEc. Iur. REv. 95, 96 (1915). Despite the existence
of several rulings after 1920 that concluded no allocation should be made, a 1921 ruling held
just the opposite. O.D. 1108, 5 CE. Income Tax Rulings 76 (1921). Cases under these acts

were also in conflict. Contrast Warner v. Walsh, 15 F.2d 367, 6 Am. Fed. Tax R. 867 (2nd Cir.
1926), with Florence L. Klein, 6 B.T.A. 617 (1927), a decision which, after citing Walsh for the
proposition that the Revenue Acts of 1916 and 1919 required that all annuity payments must
be treated as a return of capital until the purchase price is recovered, stated: "This seems to us
to read into those statutes something not fairly within their terms. They provide only that so
much of each payment as is a return of cost shall not be taxed as income; but this is a long

way from saying that each payment is a return of cost in its entirety until cost is recovered." 6
B.T.A. at 627 (1927). The Supreme Court entered into the controversy in Burnet v. Logan,

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol31/iss1/7

2

Weitzman: Revenue Ruling 69-74: An Administrative Reversal of Burnet v. Log
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXI

until the adoption of the Revenue Act of 19266 that Congress dearly manifested
its intent in favor of the former interpretation.
Eight years later another amendment was enacted. This provision, which
became section 22(b) (2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, provided that
an annuitant would be taxed each year upon so much of the payment equal to
three percent of "aggregate premiums or consideration paid for such annuity."
The remainder of each payment was exempt from tax until the aggregate
amount excluded equalled the aggregate premiums or consideration paid for
the annuity. All payments received thereafter were fully included in gross income. Thus, unlike the 1926 Act, Congress clearly mandated that annuitants be
taxed before all of their costs had been recovered. This method of taxation left
much to be desired. If the consideration paid for the annuity was relatively
large in relation to the amount of the periodic payment it would be unusual
for the annuitant to fully recover his capital. On the other hand, if the cost of
the annuity was relatively small in relation to the amount of each payment, the
annuitant's return of capital exclusion was quickly used up, leaving him with
future payments fully taxable as ordinary income. In sum, the three percent
rule was deficient because of its failure to take into account the life expectancy
of the annuitant, which dictated the amount of the annuity payments.8
In 1954, section 72 of the Internal Revenue Code was enacted "[i]n order to
provide a more equitable method of taxing annuities." 9 Basically, the section 72
formula was designed to allow a taxpayer to recover tax free his total investment in the annuity contract ratably during the annuitant's life or a fixed
number of years. 10 Under section 72, the excludible portion of an annuitant's
payment is determined by the "exclusion ratio" of section 72(b). The numerator
283 U.S. 404 (1931), with a statement in dictum that if the pertinent sum had been invested in
an annuity contract, the payments would have been free from income tax until the annuitant
had recovered his investment. 283 U.S. at 414.
6. Tit. 26, §954(b)(2), 44 Stat. 815 (1926).
7. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, §22(b)(2).
8. See S. REP. No. 1622, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 171-172 (1954). A good example of this disparate treatment is provided in Clairmont L. Egtvedt, 112 Ct. C1. 80 (1948), where a relatively
young annuitant purchased for $100,000 the right to receive $4,884 a year for the remainder of
his life. (The annuities also had a refund feature). The annuitant had a life expectancy of
about 28 years at the time he purchased the annuities, but since he was required to include
$3,000 in income every year, it would take him approximately 53 years (100,000 - 1,884) to
completely recover his investment. Despite the arbitrary nature of the 3% rule as evidenced
by the particular facts under consideration, the Egtvedt court rejected the taxpayer's attack on
the statute's constitutionality.
9. Ekman, PrivateAnnuities, 22 Ono ST. L. J. 279 (1961). As Ekman notes: "The provisions
of section 72 appear more likely to allow a greater portion of annuitants to recover their full
costs tax-free than did the old 3% rule. Furthermore, since under the new provision the
taxable amount remains constant, the former sharp increase in taxable income, once cost has
been recouped, is eliminated."
an obligation by a person or company
10. Id. at 280. An annuity may be defined as: "...
to pay to the annuitant a certain sum of money at stated times during life, or a specified
number of years, in consideration of a gross sum paid for such obligation." Chisholm v. Shields,
67 Ohio St. 374, 378-79, 66 N.E. 93, 94 (1902). For purposes of this paper, the focus will be on
the more common life annuity situation, and more specifically, the single life annuity with
annual payments.
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of the ratio is the investment in the contract -generally the total amount of
premiums or other consideration paid for the contract. The denominator of the
fraction is the expected return under the contract, which is basically the life
expectancy of the annuitant multiplied by the annual payment he receives."
Although the private annuity may simply involve the transfer of cash by the
annuitant, its purpose as an estate planning device is usually better facilitated

by transfers of property. In the former case, there is no problem with evaluating
gain or loss to the transferor since he is merely viewed as having purchased an
annuity.12 There is realized gain or loss, however, when property is transferred,

since there has been an "exchange of property for other property differing materially either in kind or in extent."1 3 It is this feature, i.e., the realization of

gain, that produces problems not present in the context of a purchase of a commercial annuity, and has led to the promulgation of Revenue Ruling 69-74.'4
The dilemma has always centered on how and when this gain should be
realized. The answer must be derived through the application of section 72,
deviating from its dictates only when other statutory and case law demand. It
should be stressed that while there may be a gain element involved, the amounts

received by the annuitant are first and foremost annuity payments.
11. This ratio is multiplied by the amount of each payment to obtain the excluded amount
representing the return of capital. The arithmetic looks as follows:
Investment in the Contract
-XAnnual Payment = Excluded Amount
Expected Return
or
Investment
in
the Contract
Invetmet
intheContact
Life Expectancy X Annual Payment

X Annual Payment - Excluded Amount

By using simple mathematics we obtain:
Investment in the Contract
= Excluded Amount
xpecancy
Life
Life Expectancy
The formula's logic is apparent. If the annuitant's life expectancy is ten years, then every
year 1/10 of the cost of the annuity is extluded, so that the actuarially "average" annuitant
will recover his cost precisely at his death. The equity of such an approach is evident from an
examination of the two possible alternatives to an annuitant dying as predicted by the
actuarial tables. If he lives longer than his projected life expectancy, he has realized more on
the annuity contract than was actuarially anticipated, and has completely recovered his
capital, yet continues to get the return of capital exclusion. On the other hand, if the annuitant should fail to reach his predicted age, a portion of his cost will remain "unrecovered"
in the sense of a tax-free return of capital. The courts have upheld the constitutionality of this
approach. Compare William Waller, 39 T.C. 665 (1963); with Manne v. Commissioner, 155
F.2d 304, 34 Am. Fed. Tax. R. 1339 (8th Cir. 1946) (1939 Code). See note 22 infra.
12. See Rev. Rul. 55-388, 1955-1 C.B. 233.
13. TRm.REG. §1.1001-1(a), T.D. 7213, 1972-2 C.B. 482.
14. Rev. Rul. 69-74, 1969-1 C.B. 43. The primary reason the problems do not exist with
the commercial annuity transaction is the fact that they are traditionally purchased with cash.
Nonetheless, the case law as well as revenue rulings that have developed in this area have
noted the income tax differences between transfers of property to private individuals and commercial entities. It is submitted that open transaction treatment should be afforded to the
annuiant in both instances. See text accompanying notes 32-36 infra.
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The initial concept that must be considered is that of "recovery of capital."
Over the years, Congress has enacted much legislation concerned with the
extent to which an annuitant's cost must be recovered before the realization of
gain takes place. 1 The private annuity transaction is one event in which gain
or loss cannot simply be computed by subtracting the adjusted basis of the
property from the amount of money immediately received in exchange for the
property. The reason is simple; the initial annual payment like the initial
payment in a section 453 installment sale does not represent the "amount
realized."' 16 The easiest solution, if theoretically valid, would be to use the fair
market value of the annuity promise as the amount realized, but this approach,
as discussed below, is not without its problems.
Another possibility would be to treat each annual payment in its entirety
as a portion of the amount realized and begin taxing the payments after the
total amount exceeded the adjusted basis of the property. In essence, each
payment would constitute a recovery of capital until the basis of property was
recovered. But this view overlooks an important consideration - how much of
each payment represents interest income, a basic component of an annuity
payment? Section 72 of the Internal Revenue Code attempts to answer this
question.
If the above problems appear complex, it is due to the fact that there is
double recovery of capital in the private annuity arrangement. It is suggested
herein that this layering of the concept of recovery of capital on itself creates
difficult conceptual problems that have resulted in the promulgation of a
revenue ruling of questionable validity. Although Congress' concern with
notions of recovery of capital as reflected in the various annuity statutes was
the same concern the Supreme Court had in the landmark case of Burnet v.
Logan, 7 a distinction must be made. Logan has no relevance where the annuity rules of section 72 are applicable.
Assume that property is transferred by an accrual basis' s taxpayer for a
commercial annuity with the fair market value of the property exceeding its
adjusted basis by $1,000. Assume further that the present value of the annuity is equal to its fair market value."" Each payment will be taxed pursuant
to section 72 since that section encompasses transfers of consideration generally;
it is not restricted to cash transfers. The Internal Revenue Service as well as the
great majority of authors would also tax our hypothetical annuitant $1,000 in
15. See note 4 supra.
16. See I.R.C. §1001(b).
17. 283 U.S. 404 (1931). In Burnet v. Logan the Supreme Court was confronted with a
situation in which the "amount realized" simply could not be valued. The taxpayer had received cash and a promise to pay $.60 per ton of ore obtained from a mine. The Court upheld
the circuit court's determination that it was impossible to ascertain the fair market value of
the promise, and the taxpayer was thus entitled to a return of capital before being subject to
tax.

18. The importance of the distinction between the cash basis and accrual basis taxpayer is
discussed in text accompanying notes 122-125 infra.
19. In the commercial setting the present value of the annuity will generally be equal to
the fair market value of the consideration given by the transferor, with a slight adjustment for
a "loading factor," i.e., a margin for profit and expenses.
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the year of the transfer as disposition gain (capital or otherwise) under section
1001, the amount realized being the fair market value of the annuity promise.
Note that the annuitant has recovered his capital (the adjusted basis in the
property transferred) before a tax was imposed, and the crucial step in determining gain was assigning a fair market value to the annuity contract. As wil
be discussed below, 20 Logan has relevance with respect to this portion of the
annuity transaction when a private annuity is utilized.
On the receipt of each annual payment the taxpayer is regarded as receiving
taxable interest as well as a non-taxable return of capital. Over the years Congress has struggled with the question of whether a tax should be imposed before

the cost of the annuity is recovered (in this case, the fair market value of the
transferred asset), and if so, what portion of each payment. In one sense this is
a Logan problem since the ultimate "amount realized" cannot be valued without assigning an actuarial life expectancy to the annuitant. In other words, the
interest element of the annuity payment (which can readily be analogized to
gain) is dependent upon a theoretical "face" value of the annuity contract,
which in turn is dependent upon the life expectancy of the annuitant. Section
72, however, has foreclosed the application of Logan to "pure" annuity payments. Strictly speaking, there is no "amount realized" in section 72 and there
is no reference to section 1001. Furthermore, there is no need to measure the
fair market value of the annuity contract. Section 72 simply authorizes the
Secretary to prescribe actuarial tables that will determine the expected return
under the annuity contract. 21 Expected return has no relationship to the concepts of fair market value or present value. It is merely a value which, if
divided into the annuitant's investment in the contract, yields a fraction that
provides an equitable method of separating the interest portion from the
capital portion of an annuity payment. 22 Thus, the adjusted basis of the
transferred property is recovered in full and the appreciation of $1,000 is subject to tax in the year of the exchange. The annuity payments are subsequently
taxed in accordance with the annuity rules of section 72, which allow a pro
rata recovery of the consideration paid. There are no problems with this
transaction insofar as the imposition of an income tax is concerned; it is the
additional factor present with respect to the present annuity, i.e., open transaction treatment for the "amount realized," that causes conceptual difficulties.
Payments received pursuant to a private annuity contract consist of two distinct recoveries of capital. To the extent the obligation represents a "pure"
annuity payment section 72 is applicable, but the payments are also received
20. See text accompanying notes 23-28 infra.
21. I.R.C. §72(c)(3)(A).
22. I.R.C. §72(b). The constitutionality of this pro rata approach was upheld by the Tax
Court in William Waller, 39 T.C. 665 (1963). The petitioners argued that the Logan principle
demanded that no part of any annuity payment could be taxed as interest income until the
annuitant had fully recovered his capital. The court stated that Logan did not involve a constitutional question but had merely held that the payment to Mrs. Logan did not constitute
income under the taxing statute in effect at that time. It pointed out that §72, however,
specifically provides that a portion of each payment is considered to be income. Thus, in ruling
upon the constitutionality of §72, the Wailer Court made a crucial distinction between
the recovery of capital notions of Logan and those of §72.
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pursuant to a taxable exchange, and therefore represent a recovery of the basis
of the transferred property as well as the gain from such exchange.
THE PRIVATE ANNUITY - CASE LAw

Now that the dual aspects of the transaction have been isolated and the
nonapplicability of the Burnet v. Logan "open transaction" doctrine to the
annuity portion demonstrated, specific treatment of its relationship to the gain
portion of the transaction is necessary. In 1929, the Board of Tax Appeals was
faced with a situation in Guaranty Trust Go.23 in which the petitioner's decedent had exchanged leasehold interests for an annuity contract that provided
for payments of $100,000 a year. The Board asserted:
Admittedly, no one could tell in 1919 how long Sherry might live or
that he might not die the next day after the sale took place, but we fail
the annuity contract of no value, or render
to see why this should make
24
it incapable of valuation.
25
Just seven years later in J. Darsie Lloyd the Board was faced with an almost identical situation (the agreement to make future payments to the
petitioner during the petitioner's life was in exchange for the transfer of shares
of stock) and, citing Logan, held the transaction to be open because the annuity did not have an exchangeable value. 26 Together, Guaranty Trust and
Lloyd provide valuable insight into the income tax differences between an
exchange with a private individual and one with a commercial entity. Citing
Guaranty Trust, the Board argued that while the fair market value of annuities
could normally be determined by actuaries, here there was the distinguishing
factor of uncertainty as to whether the transferee would actually be able to
make the payments as agreed when the time for payment arrived. The Board
referred to laws enacted to safeguard investors of institutions, pointing out that
this private investment was not subject to restrictions and supervision that
27
characterize investments with insurance companies and banks. Since Lloyd,
virtually every private annuity case to date has applied the open transaction
28
doctrine.
The aforementioned view, while firmly established in case law, is not with-

23. 15 B.T.A. 20 (1929).
24. Id. at 24.
25. 33 B.T.A. 903 (1936).
26. Although the court cited Logan, which had considered whether the value of the obligation was "ascertainable" the term "exchangeable" seems to impose a marketability requirement. Whether the Court was referring to the Logan principle, the cash equivalence doctrine,
or both, is unclear from the opinion.
27. 33 B.T.A. at 905 (1936). The Board was referring to the minimum capital and surplus
accounts as well as the actuarially computed reserves required of insurance companies. In addition, the court noted that the financial status of such companies is under constant scrutiny.
28. See, e.g., Fehrs Finance Company, 58 T.C. 174 (1972), aff'd 487 F.2d 184 (8th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied 416 U.S. 938 (1974); Commissioner v. Kann's Estate, 174 F.2d 357 (3rd Cir. 1949);
Bella Hommel, 7 T.C. 992 (1946); Hill's Estate v. Maloney, 58 F.Supp. 164 (D.N.J. 1944);
Frank C. Deering, 40 B.T.A. 984 (1939). Contra 212 Corporation, 70 T.C. 788 (1978); Estate of
Lloyd G. Bell, 60 T.C. 469 (1973).
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out its opponents. 29 To the extent that the cases hold that the promise of an
individual, corporation, trust, or partnership that is not engaged in the business
of writing annuities has no ascertainable value, no matter how wealthy the
promisor may be, the Logan holding may arguably have been broadened.
Granting that a commercial annuity can be valued, it does appear somewhat
myopic to disregard the financial status of the obligor. In Lloyd, for example,
30
the Board specifically noted that the obligor was a wealthy man, but that had
no bearing on whether or not the transaction should have been dosed. To
simply dictate open or closed transaction treatment depending upon whether
the annuity is commercial or private begs the question. As one author expressed: "The unsettled problem is at what point between the promise of an
individual transferee and that of a commercial insurance company the line of
taxability begins."31 The problem has been settled to some degree by the
issuance of Revenue Ruling 62-13632 which requires closed transaction treatment when the transferee is an organization that issues annuities "from time
to time."33
There are no cases supporting Revenue Ruling 62-136 and its relationship
to the Lloyd line of cases is unclear. The "test" is an illustration of the lack of
development of logical standards in this area. It is easy to conceive of an organization that issues annuities "from time to time" that may be on the brink
of insolvency with no financial reserves. On the other hand, an organization
may be subject to restrictions (one of which may provide for maintenance of
34
reserves) and supervision, or otherwise have substantial assets, yet fail to
issue annuities "from time to time."

While the line of cases beginning with Lloyd utilized the principles of
Logan because of the uncertainty as to whether or not the obligor will fulfill
the contract, it is contended that Logan should be applicable solely because the
life span of a particular transferor cannot be determined with any reasonable
degree of accuracy. 35 The only reason the annuity concept "works" when
utilized by insurance companies is that their actuarial predictions are amazingly

accurate when many lives are being considered. As has been noted, the fact that
the annuitant's life span is crucial to the section 72 computation and therefore
determinative of the interest portion of each payment is irrelevant for purposes
of applying Logan to the amount realized. The significant point for purposes
29. See, e.g., Ekman, supra note 9,at 282-83; Midgely, FederalIncome Taxation of Private
Annuitants, 40 GEO. WAsH. L. REv. 679, 684 (1972).

30. 33 B.T.A. at 905 (1936).
31. Ekman, supranote 9, at 283.
32. 1962-2 CB. 12.
33. id. at 12. In Dix v. Commissioner, 392 F.2d 313 (4th Cir. 1968), the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals in determining the value of an annuity had to deal with this phrase in the
context of Revenue Ruling 62-137, 1962-2 C.B. 28, issued simultaneously with 62-136. The
court held: "[1]t was intended to embrace only those organizations which write enough an.
nuity contracts to obtain a good spread of the actuarial risk." 392 F.2d at 316.
34. This factor has never been developed under the relevant case law, thereby leaving a
void with respect to wealthy educational or charitable organizations as well as other wellendowed entities.
35. Commissioner v. Kann's Estate, 174 F.2d 357 (3rd Cir. 1949), does recognize this factor.
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of this paper is that both Revenue Rulings 62-13636 and the cases cited spring
from a recognition of the principle set forth in Logan, a principle that has
been virtually ignored by the Service in Revenue Ruling 69-74. Whatever the
theory relied on, the private annuity transaction should be one of those "rare
and extraordinary circumstances" in which a property right is not susceptible
of immediate valuation. 7
THE PRivAT

ANNUITY -

RULINGS

A

COMPARISON OF REVENUE

239 AND 69-74

The great preponderance of case authority was further fortified by the
issuance of Revenue Ruling 239.38 This ruling became the ultimate recognition
of Logan's applicability to the private annuity. The ruling explicitly cited
Commissioner v. Kann's Estate,39 Lloyd, and a district court case from New
Jersey, Hill's Estate v. Maloney.4° The latter case arose under the 1939 Code
(and annuity statute) and involved a cash basis taxpayer who transferred appreciated shares of stock for life annuity contracts. The court held that the
entire annuity payment would be treated as a recovery of capital to the extent
of the taxpayer's cost basis and that capital gain would be realized to the extent
that the payments received equalled the fair market value of the property
transferred at the time of the transfer. Thereafter, the payments would be taxed
as ordinary income under section 22(b) (2).
Revenue Ruling 239, while adopting the general open transaction approach
of Hill, modified its holding by excluding the "interest" part of the annuity
payments in computing the recovery of basis and subsequent gain after basis
was recovered. Like Hill, the ruling held that after the payments (in this case
the non-interest portions of the payment) equalled the fair market value of the
property transferred, each payment became taxable in full under the 1939 Code.
The question arises as to why the fair market value of the property transferred rather than the fair market value of the annuity contract is utilized to
determine the amount of capital gain reported. The "amount realized" is defined as the "sum of any money received plus the fair market value of the
property (other than money) received."41
Insight into this rationale may be provided by the Service's statement that
the evidence did not indicate any part of the property was transferred as a gift.
The Service gives no explanation as to how it came to this conclusion. Did it
mean that the requisite donative intent was lacking? 42 Did it compare the fair
market value of the transferred property with the present value of the annuity
36. A criticism of Rev. Rul. 62-136 appears in Mancina, The Private Annuity, 43 TAXES
255 (1965).
37. See Tz. As. REG. §1.1001-1(a), T.D. 7213, 1972-2 C.B. 482; see also Rev. Rul. 58-402,
1958-2 C.B. 15.
88. 1953-2 C.B. 53.
39. 174 F.2d 357 (3rd Cir. 1949).
40. 58 F. Supp. 164 (D.N.J. 1944).
41. I.R.C. §1001(b) (emphasis supplied).
42. TxA~s. REc. §25.2512-8 (1958) makes it clear that a bona fide business transfer is not a
gift regardless of the fact that the consideration may be inadequate.
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and find equality? Most likely, the Service treated the exchange as an arm's
4
length transaction and implicitly applied the rule of United States v. Davis, 3
in which the fair market value of the property received is presumed to be the
fair market value of the property transferred when the value of the property
44
received is not "readily ascertainable."
The enigma is apparent. Application of the principles of Davis and Logan
are mutually exclusive. While the former case recognizes the difficulty of assigning a fair market value to certain property interests, it does require such
valuation, and sets out a convenient formula for doing so. Logan, however,
proposes that there are some situations in which no valuation can be made, and
the reporting of gain is deferred accordingly. The problem the Service faced in
Revenue Ruling 239 was the fact that although it accepted the applicability of
Logan, a valuation was necessary for the limited purpose of determining when
the annuity payments were no longer attributable to the exchange part of the
transaction. Thus, for purposes of Revenue Ruling 239, a theoretical "amount
realized" - the fair market value of the annuity contract - must be ascertained.
The Service opted for the fair market value of the transferred property; this
result was consistent with the principle of Davis and the Service's finding that
there was no gift, essentially a finding that the parties acted at arm's length as
required by Davis. However, any valuation will run afoul of the dictates of
Logan regardless of whether the gain recognized as a result of such valuation is
deferred. 4
A problem not confronted by the Service arises when there is a gift element,
as frequently occurs within the planning context of the private annuity. If
property with an adjusted basis of $25 and a fair market value of $100 is transferred for an annuity which has a present value as determined under the estate
tax tables4" of $95, it does not seem unreasonable to value the "amount
realized" at $100. But what if the present value of the annuity promise is $50
and the annuitant is in average health? It would certainly be difficult to assert
this was an arm's length transaction if the present value of the annuity was
$150 and the annuitant was in average health or even if the present value of
the annuity was $100 and the annuitant was terminally ill.
The gift element of the private annuity 'transaction had not been overlooked by the case law that was applicable at the time of the issuance of
Revenue Ruling 239. It had been held that the excess of the fair market value
of the transferred property over the actuarial value of the annuity promise was
a gift, and the actuarial value of the annuity was thus treated as the consideration paid for the annuity - analogous to the investment in the contract under
section 72.47 While a similar approach could be used in computing the total
43. 370 US. 65 (1962).
44. Id. at 72.
45. When referring to the permissible alternatives for valuing an annuity obligation or
contrasting the approaches taken in the revenue rulings, such reference is based on the false
assumption that a valuation must be made. See notes 152-15.4 and accompanying text infra.
46. TREAs. REG. §20.2031-10(f), T.D. 7077, 1970-2 C.B. 183.
47. See Estate of Koert Bartman, 10 T.C. 1073 (1948); Estate of Sarah A. Bergan, 1 T.C.
543 (1943). Revenue Ruling 239 did not contradict this result, and it is submitted that to the
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gain from a non-arms-length transaction, an accurate valuation of the gift
element seems to require, at least in theory, a consideration of the health of
the annuitant. Practically, however, it would be quite difficult to scrutinize the
health of every annuitant and the use of the present value of the annuity based
on the appropriate regulation4s as the "amount realized" is a good general rule
when there is a gift element. Of course, the Service would still be able to consider the health of the annuitant as a factor in determining whether the transaction was arms-length.
There had been some speculation prior to the issuance of Revenue Ruling
69-74 as to the effect of section 72 on the taxability of those payments made
after the total payments equalled the fair market value of the transferred property. The Service took the position that all payments made after the fair
market value of the transferred property had been "recovered" were solely
attributable to the annuity element of the transaction. While Revenue Ruling
239 taxed these amounts in full as ordinary income, this was consistent with the
general treatment given annuities under section 22(b) (2) (A). As previously
indicated, one of the primary reasons section 72 was enacted was to avoid this
result. Consequently, it could be argued that this conclusion would not be
supported under the 1954 Code, and the excluded portions of subsequent pay49
ments should be received tax-free.
50
Another view is that the sales aspect of the transaction is complete when
the fair market value of the transferred property has been recovered. This is
consistent with a sale-purchase approach in which the transaction is treated as
constituting two steps, a sale of the property and a purchase of the annuity
with the proceeds. The rationale for this view is based on the belief that the
total amount of gain recognized should not be affected by the fact that the
purchase price is in the form of an annuity. The question arises whether this
can be reconciled with open transaction treatment.51
The issuance of Revenue Ruling 69-74 signaled the end of the Service's
benign treatment of the private annuity. While the ruling does not tax the gain
immediately upon the exchange, it does not allow a full recovery of the basis
of the property before the gain is taxed. The approach is a hybrid one that
attempts to combine the normal principles of taxing annuity payments with a
treatment not unlike that afforded by section 453. It is submitted, however,
extent the ruling is limited to arms-length transactions, the use of the fair market value of the
transferred property as both the consideration paid for the annuity and the reference for determining gain (assuming such valuation is required) is correct. Accord, 212 Corporation, 70
T.C. 788 (1978); Estate of Lloyd G. Bell, 60 T.C. 469 (1973).
48. TREAs. REc. §20.2031-10(f), T.D. 7077, 1970-2 C.B. 183.
49. However, one writer has maintained that the excluded portion of each of these payments would continue to be taxed as gain derived from the transfer of property. Ross, The
Private Annuity as a Tax Minimizing Instrument, 41 TAXES 199, 204-07 (1963). Under this
view, in the case of a non-capital asset the same result would be reached as was obtained under
Revenue Ruling 239.
50. See, e.g., RABKIN & JOHNSON, FEDERAL INCOME, GIFr, AND ESTATE TAXATION §63.07; 1
S. SURREY, W. WARREN, P. McDANIEL & H. AULT, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 864-65 (1972);
Wallace, Taxation of PrivateAnnuities, 40 B.U.L. REv. 349, 357-58 (1960).
51. See text accompanying notes 155-156 infra.
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that Revenue Ruling 69-74 is correct only to the extent that it recognizes there
must be a recovery of capital; it overreaches by attempting to apportion a part
of each payment into recovery of capital and capital gain. Revenue Ruling 239
adopts a better approach by allowing a full recovery of capital up to the fair
market value of the transferred property, before the gain element is taxed.
Conversely, Revenue Ruling 69-74 chooses to tax the gain element ratably over
the expected term - the life expectancy of the annuitant.
As a further modification, Revenue Ruling 69-74 uses as the annuitant's
"investment in the contract" the adjusted basis of the transferred property
rather than its fair market value. Since, as in prior statutes the investment in
the contract is basically the consideration paid by the annuitant for the contract, Revenue Ruling 69-74 takes the position that the annuitant has only paid
an amount equal to the property's adjusted basis.52 Because of this modification, after the gain has been fully recognized upon completion of the annuitant's life expectancy, the interest element of each payment will be larger
with a resultant increase in tax liability. Furthermore, although Revenue Ruling 239 used the excluded portion of the annuity payment to tax the gain
element, Revenue Ruling 69-74 demands that capital gain be derived from the
interest portion of the payment5
Assume a capital asset has an adjusted basis of $1,050 and a fair market
value of $1,500. It is exchanged for a private annuity contract giving the
transferor $250 a year for the remainder of his life and has a present value of
$1500. Assume further that the annuitant has a life expectancy of ten years so
that the expected return of the obligation is $2500.
Applying the rationale of Revenue Ruling 239 as imposed upon section 72
would yield the following result: the exclusion ratio would be 60 percent (1500
- 2500) so that $150 of each annual payment would constitute the excluded
portion and $100 would be interest. After seven years the annuitant will have
recovered his basis in the property of $1,050 while having $100 of interest income in each of the years. In each of the eighth, ninth, and tenth years, the
annuitant would report $150 capital gain and $100 interest so that after the
tenth year, he would have paid the full $450 capital gain. Arguably, in year
eleven and the following years the $150 portion would be excluded completely
and the annuitant would continue to have interest income of $100.54 If he had
passed away prior to the seventh year, he would not have had any capital gain
since all his capital had yet to be recovered.
Under Revenue Ruling 69-74, the exclusion ratio would be 42 percent (1050
2500) so that $105 of each annual payment would constitute the excluded
portion and $145 the non-excluded portion. The $450 would be recognized
ratably over ten years, resulting in $45 capital gain in years one through ten.
The $45 would have to come from the non-excluded portion so that each $250
52. Rev. Rul. 69-74, 1969-1 C.B. 43, 44. The ruling states that the untaxed gain does not
represent any part of the consideration paid for the annuity contract.
53. By using the adjusted basis as the investment in the contract, only such basis can be
recovered from the excluded portion. The excess of the fair market value over the basis must
come from the interest portion, albeit ratably.
54. See text accompanying note 49 supra.
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payment for ten years would consist of: $105 excluded, $45 capital gain, and
$100 interest. For the first ten years the corresponding income tax treatment
under the different rulings is similar. The only significant difference is that
under Revenue Ruling 239 the annuitant reported his capital gain only after
he had recovered his capital, resulting in three years of capital gain in the
amount of $150 for each of years eight, nine, and ten; however, under Revenue
Ruling 69-74 there was $45 capital gain for each of the ten years. For the
annuitant who fulfills his projected life span, at that point in time the total
amount of taxable income is identical- under the two methods. It is the failure
to allow a full recovery of capital before taxing the gain that constitutes the
basic difference.
An even more crucial distinction exists, however, for payments received
after the annuitant has outlived his life expectancy. Under Revenue Ruling
69-74 the non-excluded portion of $145 is now fully taxable each year as
ordinary income. That is $45 a year more than computed under Revenue Ruling 239 and represents the use of the adjusted basis as the "investment in the
contract." 56 There are several questions which immediately arise upon even a
cursory examination of this structure. Does not the taxation of the $45 capital
gain out of the $145 non-excluded portion run counter to the purpose of
section 72, in which the entire non-excluded portion was to represent ordinary
income? Interwoven with this question is the propriety of a taxing principle
which can convert $45 of capital gain into ordinary income merely because the
total amount of gain has been reported. While the above conceptual problems
are easily observable, a more thorough analysis would be necessary to condemn
the ruling.
One difference between the rulings has been glossed over as a result of a
convenient assumption made in the hypothetical; the fair market value of the
transferred property is equal to the present value of the private annuity.
Neither ruling refers to the fair market value of the private annuity but both
implicitly take the position that its fair market value is presumed to be equal
to other amounts - the fair market value of the transferred property (Revenue
Ruling 239)57 or the present value of the annuity (Revenue Ruling 69-74). It is
submitted that the distinction between the two rulings with respect to this
point may be illusory.58
55. Of course, the tax liability may not be the same, depending upon the annuitant's
other taxable income during the years.
56. One commentator suggests that the portion of the payments representing gain which
are taxable as interest after the fair market value of the property has been recovered are received solely because of the annuitant's longevity, not because of a sale, and therefore should
constitute further "excludible mortality gain." See Vernava, infra note 140, at 34-35.
57. See text accompanying notes 41-44 supra.
58. Ruling 69-74 states that the gain recognized on the transfer is determined by using the
present value of the annuity based on U.S. Life Table 38 contained in paragraph (f) of
§20.2031-7 of the Estate Tax Regulations. In essence, the Service has decided that the present
value of the annuity is a better indicator of the fair market value of the annuity than the fair
market value of the transferred property. To the extent that there is a gift element to the
transaction, it has been contended that Revenue Ruling 239 is not inconsistent with this
treatment. A close reading of Revenue Ruling 69-74 indicates that the use of the estate tax
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The change in position by the Service was "explained" by a statement in
Revenue Ruling 69-74 that Revenue Ruling 239 was issued under a different
set of annuity rules; section 22(b) (2) of the 1939 Code, and its relevance to
section 72(b) of the 1954 Code was no longer applicable. This reasoning has
been attacked by many authors 59 and should be examined here. As described
earlier, section 72 was enacted to provide a more logical, consistent approach to
the apportionment of annuity payments into capital and income. The newer
scheme, using a ratable approach not unlike that of the section 453 installment
reporting provisions,60 was designed to allow more annuitants to recover their
bases, but eliminate the sharp increase in interest income after cost had been
recovered1 No justification for the substantial modifications made in Revenue
Ruling 69-74 can be found in the changes made in section 72. The probability
of an annuitant recovering his basis has been decreased instead of increased, in
direct contravention of the Congressional purpose behind section 72. Furthermore, the increase in interest income after the annuitant has reached his life
expectancy as projected from the annuity transaction date is similarly contrary
to the intention of section 72. Thus, there seems to be no support for the
Service's contention that the amendment to the annuity statute provides a basis
for modifying the rules applicable to private annuities.
Still, the validity of the ruling should not depend on the purported reasons
behind its issuance. This begs the crucial question as to whether there is in
fact some justification for its principles. For purposes of convenience the ruling
may be said to have stood for two basic propositions. The first, dealing with the
method by which the recovery of capital occurs, has been treated above. In
this respect, the pro rata recovery of capital not only ffies in the face of the
purpose of section 72, but it also violates fundamental principles of tax law.
The Service can be viewed as having effectively closed the transaction at the
time of the exchange, and then, in an effort to ameliorate the harshness of this
approach, utilized the installment reporting of section 453.
The rationale for this pro rata recognition of gain is unclear from the ruling
itself. One writer states that it is a recognition that the annuity payment is not
the equivalent of cash.62 Another states that the ruling closes the transaction
yet "represents approval of an informal or nonstatutory method of reporting
income, since an election is not made, and the annuitant is not bound by the

rules of Section

453."63

Perhaps the Service was employing the same logic

present value regulations is not expressly mandated in all instances. It may be argued that
this particular aspect of the ruling is restricted to private annuities with gift, elements, and
that in arm's length transactions the rule of Revenue Ruling 239 is applicable. The principles
of Revenue Ruling 69-74 are introduced by the following statement: "Accordingly, the tax
consequences of the private annuity transaction in this (emphasis supplied), case are determined by applying the following principles... :'
59.

See, e.g., Note, Private Annuities: Revenue Ruling 69-74 -Its Significance, Effect, and

Validity, 23 VAN. L. Ray. 675 (1970); Wallace, supranote 50.

60. I.R.C. §453(a).
61. See text accompanying note 9 supra.
62. See Midgely, supra note 29, at 688.
63. Vernava, infra note 140, at 33.
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utilized in the dissenting opinion in Estate of Lloyd G. Bell.64 The dissenters,
in rejecting the applicability of the "open transaction" doctrine to the transfer
of property in a private annuity transaction, stated: "Such an approach is manifestly inconsistent with the objective of Section 72; whereas, an approach which
prorates the capital gains would be consistent with the approach taken by that
section."65
The second proposition of Revenue Ruling 69-74 is the use of the adjusted
basis of the transferred property as the investment in the contract. If such use is
proper, the resultant increase in taxable income after the recovery of cost is an
acceptable result, regardless of the fact it may appear to violate the purpose of
section 72. Using the adjusted basis as the investment in the contract but rejecting the pro rata recovery of cost principle would entail adopting a hybrid
taxing scheme in which principles of Revenue Ruling 239 and Revenue Ruling
69-74 would be combined. In our hypothetical, the annuitant would receive
$105 recovery of capital every year for ten years as well as $145 interest income.
In years eleven, twelve, thirteen and fourteen he would have $105 capital gain
and $145 interest income. In year fifteen he would have $30 capital gain and
$145 interest income and after year fifteen he would merely have $145 interest
income every year. The other $105 would represent the excluded amount.6
Although most commentators labelled the approach taken in Revenue
Ruling 239 as sale-purchase theory,67 it can also be readily explained by section
72(c)(1)(A) which defines the investment in the contract as "the aggregate
amount of premiums or other consideration paid for the contract." This same
clause was utilized in section 22(b)(2) of the 1939 Code under which Hill and
Revenue Ruling 239 originated. Under section 22(b)(2) however, the greater
the "investment in the contract" the greater the revenue producing effect. With
the present exclusion ratio of section 72 the use of fair market value has become
more favorable to the taxpayer. However, there is nothing in section 72 or its
legislative history, including the Congressional purposes described earlier, that
indicates the clauses should be interpreted differently. Even without resort to
past statutory interpretation it appears logical that the consideration provided
for the annuity promise would be the fair market value of the property (assuming there is no gift). Certainly, the obligor of the annuity contract is not concerned about the adjusted basis of the property. He is bargaining for the fair
64. 60 T.C. 469 (1973).
65. Id. at 479. That Judge Simpson has not retreated from this position is evidenced by
his dissenting opinion in 212 Corporation, 70 T.C. 788 (1978).
66. It must be noted that in this situation the taxpayer is better off under Revenue Ruling
69-74, where $45 of the $145 interest income is capital gain in years one through ten, and
there is no capital gain reported after year ten. The fourth possible approach, rejecting the
adjusted basis as the investment in the contract but accepting the pro rata reporting of gain,
was taken by the dissenters in Bell. Using this treatment, our hypothetical annuitant would
have $150 as the excluded amount under §72. Of this $150, he would report $45 capital gain
for the first ten years. During this period he would also have $100 a year interest. This is the
same result obtained under Revenue Ruling 69-74. The difference is manifested only when
the annuitant outlives his life expectancy. Under the approach of the Bell dissenters, he must
report only $100 interest income each year.
67. See text accompanying notes 50-51 supra.
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market value of the property and, strictly speaking, it is that which provides
the consideration for his promise.
As justification for its modification of the sale-purchase theory, Revenue
Ruling 69-74 states: "Since the amount of the gain is not taxed in full at the
time of the transaction, such amount does not represent a part of the 'premiums
or other consideration paid' for the annuity contract." 6s Thus, the ruling implicitly rejects the sale-purchase theory as well as the usual tax principles applicable when property is purchased for other property.- Instead, the transaction is treated as a non-taxable exchange in which the basis of the property
transferred is substituted for the basis of the property received.
Therefore, upon closer examination, the sale-purchase theory does not appear to be a viable one. If the property had in fact been sold for cash, and the
cash then used to purchase an annuity there would have been a taxable gain to
the seller. It is proposed here that there should be no gain recognized to the
seller upon the exchange. "Taxwise," his investment in the contract should be
only his original investment in the property. 70
Even if Revenue Ruling 69-74 were correct in recognizing the gain pro rata
over the life expectancy of the annuitant, some commentators would argue the
ruling is inconsistent in failing to adjust the investment in the contract as gain
is recognized. In virtually all the transferred basis rules gain recognized on the
exchange is added to the substituted basis.71 If periodic adjustments were made,
there would be no additional interest income after the total amount of capital
gain is taxed: since at that point the fair market value of the property would
have been recovered and, hence, would be equal to the investment in the
contract.

There is a major problem with this proposal, however. One of the major
themes of section 72 is that the exclusion ratio is to be constant over the life of
68. 1969-1 C.B. 43.
69. United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962); I.R.C. §1012. The Service may have opened
the door for a sale-purchase theory argument when it issued Revenue Ruling 71-492 which
disallowed a loss where depredated property was transferred for a private annuity. Holding
that the transferred basis in the annuity was its fair market value, it likened the transaction to
a sale of the property at a loss (which was not deductible since the transaction was not
entered into for profit) and a purchase of the annuity with the proceeds. This ruling is probably limited to depreciated property, however. 1971-2 C.B. 127. See also, note 145 infra.
70. One writer notes that the §1012 cost-as-basis rule expressly provides that it will apply
unless another code section dictates otherwise. The open transaction doctrine is a judicial
doctrine, and seemingly outside the exceptions to §1012. However, the author goes on to
comment: "Sections 1001 and 1002 indicate that Congress expected that exchanges of property
not specifically made nontaxable by the Code would be taxed in the year of the transaction; to
the extent that the courts create additional nontaxable exchanges, they should also apply the

substituted basis provisions to prevent the avoidence of tax." Midgely, supra note 29, at 697
n.85.
71. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§1031(d), 1035, 1036, 1037, 1038, 334(c), 358, 362. Assuming the substituted basis rules were applicable, one commentator would add any gain recognized at the
time of the transaction as well as in subsequent years to the annuitant's investment in the
contract as the gain is taxed. See Note, supra note 59. An even more complicated approach is
described in Raiborn & Watkins, CriticalAnalysis of Private Annuity Taxation, 50 TAXES 11,

19 (1972) which, describing Sams' method as incomplete, treats each year as a separate transaction.
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the annuitant or annuitants.72 Evidence of this fact is found in sections 72(b)
and 72(c) of the Code as well as the legislative history of the provision. Section
72(c)(1) defines the "investment in the contract" as of the "annuity starting
date." Section 72(c)(4) defines the annuity starting date. It is clear that Congress
intended these "investments in the contract" to be determined as of a certain
date with no provision for variation because of subsequent events. Section 72(b)
which defines "exclusion ratio" specifically qualifies "investment in the contract" with the parenthetical phrase "as of the annuity starting date." Furthermore, the Regulations under section 1.72-4 can be read as ruling out the possibility of a varying exclusion ratio. Section 72(c)(2) provides further credence
to this view as it gives specific rules for adjusting the "investment in the contract" only under particular circumstances.74
In sum, one has to overcome several hurdles to successfully attack the
Service's position as set out in Revenue Ruling 69-74. The main assertion would
be that once gain used to acquire property is taxed it becomes part of the
basis in the property acquired,75 and that this is valid whether or not the gain
is taxed at the time of the original transaction.- Even if this argument is successful, only the basis of the annuity would be increased. An upward adjustment
of basis does not necessarily mean the "investment in the contract" is similarly
adjusted. The latter concept is specifically set forth in section 72, which rejects
the notion of a fluctuating investment.77 The value of the investment is important only for purposes of determining the exclusion ratio of section 72(b)
and thereby allocating return of capital and income with respect to each annuity payment. Theoretically, the basis of the annuity contract is irrelevant to
78
this consideration.
M
T

M

THE CASH EQUIVALENcE DOCTRINE

Strangely, both Revenue Rulings 239 and 69-74 fail to take account of the
method of accounting utilized by the transferor-annuitant. Very generally,
under the cash method receipts and income items are reported in the year
actually or constructively received; under the accrual method these items are
reported in the year in which the right to receipt arises.79 With respect to the

72. See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
73. See, e.g., TREAs. REG. §1.72-4(a)(4) (1975).
74. Adjustment is allowed only if the contract provides for "refund" payments to a
beneficiary after the death of an annuitant or annuitants. I.R.C. §72(c)(2).
75. See note 71 supra.
76. The substituted basis provisions increase the basis of the acquired property by the
gain "recognized on such exchange." (Emphasis supplied). See note 71 supra. The theory of an
open transaction dictates that there is a continuing exchange until the transaction is dosed.
77. A possible solution is that the analogy of the substituted basis provisions should not
be utilized to determine the investment in the contract when the latter notion frustrates the
full application of tax principles.
78. The basis would, of course, be important if there were a subsequent disposition of the
private annuity contract.
79. Spring City Foundry Co. v. Commissioner, 292 U.S. 182, 13 Am. Fed. Tax R. 1164
(1934).
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cash method, it is clear that income is not limited to cash, but includes cash
and its equivalent.80 Thus, putting notions of Logan aside, a fundamental
question arises with regard to the cash method annuitant: is the value of an
annuity promise the equivalent of cash so as to constitute an "amount realized"
thereby causing immediate recognition of the gain element of the private annuity transaction? While the cash equivalence doctrine may be distinguished
from the principle announced in Logan, those situations in which a taxpayer
receives the equivalent of cash will dictate the same "closed" treatment that
occurs when the fair market value of property is determinable.
Perhaps the key characteristic of something that is equivalent to cash is its
marketability. The utilization of a security interest in a private annuity transaction has traditionally been avoided by tax planners for this very reason. A
security arrangement within the private annuity scheme was given a rude reception by the Tax Court in Bell. 8 In Bell, the annuitant transferred stock
which was placed in escrow to secure the promise of the transferor. As further
security, a cognitive judgment against the transferor was provided for if a default occurred.
The court explicitly rejected the applicability of either Revenue Ruling 239
S
or Revenue Ruling 69-74, as well as Logan, Lloyd, and Frank C. Deering2

because of the existence of the security interest. In essence, the security interest
gave the annuity contract a determinable value under section 1001, and the
Court accordingly denied the taxpayer open transaction treatment.83 The
80. 2 J. MrTEaxs, The Law of FederalIncome Taxation, §11.01 at 2 (1974).
81. 60 T.C. 469 (1973).
82. 40 B.T.A. 984 (1939).
83. Accord, 212 Corporation, 70 T.C. 788 (1978). Bell and 212 Corporationread together
with Lazarus, 58 T.C. 854 (1972), provide some strange implications. In Lazarus the petitioners
established a foreign situs trust for the benefit of members of their family and transferred to it
shares of stock in exchange for a private annuity agreement. The Tax Court treated the
petitioners as owners of the trust within the meaning of §677(a) and therefore taxable on the
trust income under §671. The Court recast the arrangement as a transfer in trust with a retention of an income interest, rejecting the petitioner's contention that it was a sale. The support for the court's position rested in the fact that the petitioners did not get a down payment
and there was no security for payment. On the other hand there is some authority that when
the transferred property itself is placed with a trustee as security for the annuity payments,
this, along with other factors, may cause the property to be included in the transferor's estate.
If the absence of security is vital to open transaction treatment and the presence of security
is required to avoid the Lazarus result, one can readily see the dilemma when the private
annuity arrangement is combined with a trust device. In practice, however, this principle may
be applied narrowly. In 212 Corporation, the amount of the rental payments received by the
transferee from the transferred property closely paralleled the amounts to be paid by the
transferee to the annuitant. An arrangement had been established whereby the rental payments would be sufficient to cover the annuity payments after the transferee expended
amounts for insurance, taxes, and certain miscellaneous expenses. Furthermore, the transferee
had no source of income other than the rental payments. Nonetheless, the Commissioner did
not assert that the transaction was a transfer with a retained interest in the income, rather
than a sale. The problem with limiting the payments to be made by the transferee to the
income derived from the property is discussed in Latest Developments in the Tax Treatment
of PrivateAnnuity Transactions,47 TEx. L. R V.416 (1969). See also Rev. Rul. 68-183, 1968-1
C.B. 308; Wallace, supra note 50.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol31/iss1/7

18

Weitzman: Revenue Ruling 69-74: An Administrative Reversal of Burnet v. Log
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXI

opinion is correct in distinguishing Lloyd and Deering since those cases held
the transaction open only because of the uncertainty as to whether the obligor
would be able to make the payments. That particularuncertainty was obviated
in Bell by the presence of security. The holding of Logan, however, cannot be
similarly distinguished, as it represents a more general approach.8 4 Nowhere in
the majority opinion was the doctrine of cash equivalence articulated, but implicitly the contract was considered to be the equivalent of cash. The added
feature of a security interest would certainly make the obligation more marketable.
Because the existence of a security interest in the transferred property removed the case from the scope of Revenue Ruling 69-74, an uncomplicated
taxing formula emerged. Since the security interest closed the transaction, all
of the gain was taxed immediately and each annuity payment could then be
treated solely under the annuity rules of section 72. In contrast, Revenue Rulings 239 and 69-74 encompass situations in which the gain element is not
immediately taxed.
The first case to directly confront the issue of what amount constitutes the
investment in the contract involved the retention of a security interest in the
transferred property. With an abundance of complicated factual and legal problems to resolve, in 212 Corporation,5 the Tax Court chose to make the investment in the contract issue the starting point for its inquiry. Curiously, the
Court disposed of the problem as quickly as it had arisen, stating: "It is now
well settled that in cases in which appreciated property is transferred in consideration for an annuity, the annuitant's investment in the contract is the fair
market value of the property transferred."8 As authority for this "well-settled"
principle, the Court cited Bell as well as two private annuity cases predating
Revenue Ruling 69-74.87 As discussed earlier, however, the Bell Court specifically declined to consider the validity of the ruling since the security interest
caused the factual basis to be sufficiently distinguishable from that of Revenue
Ruling 69-74. Assuming that the Bell Court was correct in closing the transaction upon the sale, the issue as to what amount should constitute the investment in the contract became moot; none of the reasons for utilizing the adjusted basis of the transferred property existed since the entire appreciation was
taxed immediately.
Although the Tax Court may have mistakenly relied on precedent ss in
rejecting the use of the property's adjusted basis as the annuitant's investment
in the contract in 212 Corporation, there is a strong inference that such rejection had independent significance. Following its citations of precedent, the
Court added a "but see" reference to Revenue Ruling 69-74, thereby acknowl84.

See text accompanying notes 119-120 infra.

85. 70 T.C. 788 (1978).
86. Id. The Court then went on to state that this rule does not apply when the parties are
not dealing at arm's length. See note 47 supra and accompanying text.
87. DeCanizares, 32 T.C. 345 (1959); Gillespie, 38 B.T.A. 673 (1938).
88. The earlier opinions have little precedential value as the Commissioner had no ruling upon which he could rely, and, in fact, did not even assert the position subsequently taken
in Revenue Ruling 69-74.
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edging its differing principle and excluding its application. Although the ruling
may be reconciled with Bell and thus remain viable in unsecured private annuity transactions, the Court chose to reject its validity under the 212 Corporation facts. It is interesting to note that the annuity present in 212 Corporation
was secured89 and the Court, following Bell, dosed the transaction and taxed
the appreciation in the year of the exchange. Therefore, the Court could have
conveniently sidestepped the investment in the contract issue (as it did in Bell)
without referring to the revenue ruling. Instead, it went out of its way to confront the issue at the outset of its opinion, before its determination that the
transaction be dosed in the year of the transfer.
The Commissioner could still assert that the recent decision was nothing
more than a confirmation of the principles announced in Bell and that Revenue
Ruling 69-74 still applies to unsecured transactions. Indeed, the Court's
opinion with respect to this issue may be considered as dictum. Nevertheless, it
provides valuable insight into the Tax Court's attitude, and the Service can
enjoy little solace if, indeed, direction of the Tax Court with regard to unsecured transactions is apparent. It should be noted that the Commissioner did
not assert that the petitioner's investment in the contract was limited to the
adjusted basis of the property in his notice of deficiency. He did take that posi90
This action can not be
tion in his 30-day letter, but apparently abandoned it.
that the transaction
the
belief
the
Commissioner
explained by attributing to
ratably over
reportable
should be closed since he had argued that the gain was
was
the
Commissioner
that
the life expectancy of the annuitants. It appears
attempting to avoid a confrontation on the issue, and could not have been
pleased with the gratuitous statements made by the Court. It should be stressed
that the Service has not revoked the ruling nor any of its elements, and since
there is no evidence to suggest a reversal in position, it would be foolish to
assume the Commissioner will not continue to rely on it.
Although the cash equivalence doctrine may be asserted by the Commissioner as a justification for dosing various transactions, it is frequently cited by
taxpayers who wish to receive open transaction treatment. The doctrine
operates when an item has been received that is other than cash, but can be
valued in terms of money. 91 In one sense, this description provides a standard
for treating obligations the same as cash, but it also expresses a limitation - i.e.,
only those obligations which are the equivalent of cash are treated as such. It is
in this latter sense that the doctrine is hereafter referred. Within this context,
the cash equivalence doctrine becomes most relevant to the private annuity
transaction. For the cash basis private annuitant, it provides a distinct theory

under which he may arguably receive open transaction treatment.
It has been said that the cash equivalence doctrine implies that "the taxpayer has something which is presently disposable in the same way that cash
89. The annuity was secured by the transferred property and the rents and profits realized
therefrom. Furthermore, the transferee was not permitted to sell or mortgage the property
without the consent of the annuitants. The agreement also contained a confession of judgment
clause like that in Bell.
90. 60 T.C. 469 (1978).
91. TREAS.REG. §1.446-1(a)(3) (1972).
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is disposable."92 However, the requirement of disposability may not be as
crucial as the above quote indicates. In the Supreme Court case of Helvering v.
Bruun9s gain that was not "separately disposable" was subject to income tax. 94
There, the taxpayer had leased land and a building for ninety-nine years with
the condition that any buildings erected by the lessee became the lessor's property upon the termination of the lease. When the lease was cancelled for default of rental payments, the lessor received back the land with a new building, the old building having been demolished by the lessee. The Court held that
the value of the new building minus the adjusted basis of the old building was
taxable as ordinary income in the year of termination. The taxpayer unsuccessfully argued that capital gain should be recognized only upon the disposition
of the building, as the Court determined that the economic gain resulting from
the appreciation of the recaptured asset was realized within the meaning of the
95
sixteenth amendment.
Bruun made it easy for the Tax Court in Renton K. Brodie9- to tax an
employee on the cost, presumably equal to the fair market value of an annuity contract purchased by his employer, even though the contract was not
assignable and could not be surrendered for cash by the employee. Although the
cash equivalence doctrine was not articulated, the court implicitly held that
Brodie, a cash basis taxpayer, had received the equivalent of cash. The applicability of Brodie to the private annuity transaction was severely limited
three years later when the Tax Court distinguished a situation in which the
payor of compensation, an executor who obtained the services of the taxpayer
as an accountant, made an unfunded agreement to pay the taxpayer periodic
payments for life:
The letter represented a contract of employment under which the
petitioner might receive payments for life provided he fulfilled his part
of the bargain. No regular and unconditional annuity was purchased. It
would appear that no amount was taxable at that time under the principles announced later in Renton K. Brodie, but whatever he received
in payments would be taxable income as received. 97
Since an annuity contract itself is nothing more than a contractual promise to
make payments, the fact that the Brodie annuity was funded seemed to provide the crucial distinction. Another possible rationale is simply that the
promisor of the annuity contract was the employer and not a third party.98
92. MERTENS, supra note 80, at 4.
93. 309 U.S. 461 (1940).
94. This was the view of many tax experts. See, e.g., Surrey, The Supreme Court and the
Federal Income Tax: Some Implications of the Recent Decisions, 35 ILL. L. Rzv. 779 (1941).
95. In Eisner v. MacComber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920), the Supreme Court held that there is a
requirement of realization in the sixteenth amendment, which states: "The Congress shall have
power to lay and collect taxes on income, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several states, and without regard to any census or enumeration."
96. 1 T.C. 275 (1942).
97. William E. Freeman, 4 T.C. 582, 584 (1945) (citation omitted).
98. See, e.g., Helvering v. Price, 309 U.S. 409, 23 Am. Fed. Tax R. 657 (1940); Commissioner
v. Olmstead, 304 F.2d 16, 9 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 1699 (8th Cir. 1962); Comment, 22 U.C.L.A. L.

REv. 219, 231 (1973).
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Although the doctrine has been in existence for many years, there is neither
a case nor a revenue ruling that has provided a precise definition of "cash
equivalence." Revenue Ruling 68-606, 99 citing Bruun and Cowden v. Commissioner,1 00 stated:
Certain evidences of indebtedness are property deemed to be equivalent
to cash, but not all evidences of indebtedness are property the fair
market value of which is includible in the income of a taxpayer on the
cash receipts and disbursements method of accounting. However, a
deferred payment obligation which is readily marketable and immediately convertible to cash is property the fair market value of which is
income to a cash method taxpayer in the year of receipt to the extent of
that fair market value.1 01
The ruling concerned cash method taxpayers who had received an installment
bonus contract as consideration for an oil and gas lease. The Service stressed
the following factors in holding the doctrine of cash equivalence applicable:
(1) the payments were unconditionally payable; (2) the obligor was solvent and
had an excellent credit record; (3) liability was evidenced by an enforceable
02
contract; and (4) the rights under the contract were freely transferrable.
There is much authority that an unsecured contractual promise is not property which is the equivalent of cash. It is neither reflected by "notes, mortgages,
or other evidence of indebtedness such as commonly change hands in commerce."103 In Estate of Coid Hurlburto4 the Tax Court viewed unsecured
contractual obligations on a sale of real estate to be nothing more than accounts
receivable. After noting the petitioner was a cash basis taxpayer, the court emphasized the fact that no note, bond, mortgage or other evidence of indebtedness was received.
With a solid tradition that a bare contract right to receive income is not
6
the equivalent of cash, 0 5 the case of Cowden v. Commissioner0o
arose. In
Cowden the petitioners made an oil, gas, and mineral lease with an oil and gas
company wherein the oil company subsequently agreed to make "advance
royalty" or bonus payments. The contract evidenced an unconditional obligation to make these additional payments. The taxpayer assigned the payments
to a bank for their face value, discounted by certain nominal amounts. The
99. 1968-2 C.B. 42.
100. 289 F.2d 20, 7 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 1160 (5th Cir. 1961). See notes 105-107 infra and
accompanying text.
101. Rev. Rul. 68-606, 1968-2 C.B. 42. This statement appears to infer that property may
have a fair market value and yet not be the equivalent of cash. At other times the service takes
the position that property with a fair market value is the equivalent of cash. See, e.g., TzAs.
REG. §1.1001-1(a) (1972). The ruling does not distinguish evidences of indebtedness from payments of indebtedness.
102. See also Rev. Rul. 71-173, 1971-1 C.B. 40. Both Revenue Rulings 68-606, 1968-2 C.B.
42, and 71-173 emphasize marketability and transferability as a requisite to cash equivalence.
103. Harold W. Johnston, 14 T.C. 560, 565 (1950).
104. 25 T.C. 1286 (1956).
105. See also Nina J. Ennis, 17 T.C. 465 (1951); Western Oaks Building Corp., 49 T.C. 865

(1968).
106. 289 F.2d 20 (5th Cir. 1961).
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Commissioner determined that the contractual obligations of the oil company
to make payments in future years represented ordinary income in the amount
of the fair market value of the obligations at the time they were created, and
discounted the payments at the rate of four percent from the date of the agreements until the respective maturity dates. The Tax Court asserted that the
bonus payments were readily and immediately convertible into cash and applying the doctrine of constructive receipt held the taxpayer had ordinary
income in the amount of the face value of the obligations in the year they were
created. The court, acknowledging that generally executory contracts to make
future payments do not have a fair market value, stressed some factors which it
felt distinguished this case: (1) the only reason the bonuses were not immediately paid in cash was the refusal of the lessor to accept the payments; (2) the
bank, of which the petitioner was an officer, was willing to, and in fact did,
purchase the rights at a nominal discount; and (3) the bank generally dealt in
such contracts when satisfied with the financial responsibility of the payor.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected this rationale, dismissing particularly the applicability of constructive receipt. Stating that a negotiable
promissory note is not necessarily the equivalent of cash since the maker may
be of doubtful solvency or the paper may be otherwise unmarketable, the court
went on to give the most expansive view of the cash equivalence doctrine to
date:
We are convinced that if a promise to pay of a solvent obligor is unconditional and assignable, not subject to set-offs, and is of a kind that is
frequently transferred to lenders or investors at a discount not substantially greater than the generally prevailing premium for the use of
money, such promise is the equivalent of cash and taxable in like manner
had it been received by the taxpayer
as cash would have been taxable
0 7
rather than the obligation.1
In Warren Jones Co. v. Commissioner- s the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
rejected 09 one element of the Cowden test. It held that a contract, the assignment of which involves a discount substantially greater than the generally prevailing rate for the use of money, may still be considered the equivalent of
cash if it merely has a fair market value. After tracing the history of section
1001 of the Internal Revenue Code the court concluded that if the fair market
value of the property" 9 received in an exchange can be ascertained, section 1001
requires that this value be reported as an amount realized. The court asserted
107.
108.

Id. at 24.
524 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1975).

109. In a footnote, however, the Jones court stated that Cowden did not conflict with its
decision since the language in the Cowden opinion was intended to describe only the particular obligation involved in that case. Id. at 791, n.6.

110. In the dissenting opinion as well as Judge Scott's concurring opinion in the Tax
Court, it was concluded that the presence of the large discount factor resulted in the contract
not having sufficient marketability to constitute "property" other than money received. The
argument that a contractual right to receive future cash payments is not property unless it
meets the test of cash equivalence is explicitly discussed in Bedell v. Commissioner, 30 F.2d
622, 624 (2d Cir. 1929), and may be implicitly recognized in Rev. Rul. 68-606, 1968-2 C.B. 42.
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that section 453 supported 11 this conclusion, being enacted to prevent the
harshness of section 1001. The opinion does cite with approval Treasury Regulation section 1.1001-1(a), which admits there are situations, albeit "rare and
extraordinary," in which fair market value is impossible to ascertain. Nevertheless, the interplay between the cash equivalence doctrine and section 1001, and
the consequent merging of the cash and accrual basis methods of accounting,
keynotes the opinion.
While section 1001 appears to require only that an obligation have a fair
market value to constitute an amount realized, the cash equivalence doctrine
mandates that the obligation be the equivalent of cash.
It is difficult to evaluate to what extent Warren Jones has broken with
.
precedent, especially in view of two cryptic footnotes. 12 In one, the court

urges that its decision does not conflict with Cowden. In another, it states that
it need not determine whether the doctrine of cash equivalence is obsolete or
whether any property with a fair market value is the equivalent of cash. Perhaps Warren Jones can be analyzed as holding that section 1001 should operate
independently of the taxpayer's method of accounting, a proposition that is not
without its supporters." 3 However, this approach has an obvious flaw. It has
never been successfully argued that the fair market value of an obligation payable over a substantial period of time is equal to its face value.114 The practice
of discounting obligations illustrates the untenability of this position. While it
is dear that a cash basis taxpayer has realized the fair market value of an obligation acquired pursuant to a sale or exchange (perhaps subject to the cash
equivalence doctrine), the Service has successfully advanced that an accrual
basis taxpayer has realized the face amount.
Nevertheless, it is generally asserted that Warren Jones is limited to those
situations covered by section 1001(b), and does not affect the applicability of
the cash equivalence doctrine outside of this context. Of course, this is of little
help to the transferor in the private annuity transaction who wishes to obtain
open transaction treatment unless the decision is read as only rejecting one
Ill. The taxpayer argued that §453(b)(3) may be read as Congress' definition of cash
equivalent. The argument was rejected by the Jones court as it would have imposed a greater
liquidity requirement with respect to the doctrine. The statute dictates that evidences of in-

debtedness that are "payable on demand" or "readily tradeable" are treated as payments for
the purpose of §453(b).
112. 524 F.2d 788, 791 n.6, 794 n.9 (9th Cir. 1975).
113. See, e.g., S. SURREY & W. WARREN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, 653-54 (1960). One
commentator provides an interesting argument that reconciles §§1001(b), 446 and 451, so as to
make the taxpayer's accounting method (and therefore the cash equivalence doctrine) vital to
§1001. Basically, the argument is that §1001(b) is concerned with only the "amount realized"
not the amount recognized. Theoretically, "except as otherwise provided in this subtitle ..
contained in the recognition rule of §1001(c) (Now §1002) includes §§446 and 451.
114. In Cowden, although the Tax Court originally held the taxpayer liable for the face
value of the obligation, this was based on the theory of constructive receipt, an approach subsequently rejected by the appellate court. For the accrual basis taxpayer it is the face value of
the obligation that controls. Western Oaks Building Corp., 49 T.C. 365 (1968); George L.
Castner Co., 30 T.C. 1061, 1068 (1958). Although TREAs. REG. §1-453-6 may lead to a contrary
result, most commentators believe the regulation applies only to cash basis taxpayers. See, e.g.,
Desmond, Sales of Property Under the Deferred Payment Method, 32 TAxEs 40 (1954).
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element of the doctrine as set forth in Cowden - the substantial discount test.
The impact of Warren Jones on the cash basis annuitant cannot be accurately
evaluated until its impact on the cash equivalence doctrine generally is darifled. While it appears that the principle that a debt instrument must be
negotiable to be the equivalent of cash may be on its way out, even the nontraditional holding of Cowden has other equivalence requirements. 115 Furthermore, these requirements were not expressly disturbed by the Warren Jones
holding. It must also be remembered that the harsh principle of Warren Jones
is presently the law only in the Ninth Circuit.
Thus, one of the major deficiencies in Revenue Ruling 69-74 is its ignorance
of the annuitant's method of accounting. Despite the recent liberality in the
cash equivalence doctrine and the resultant merging of the two accounting
methods, the doctrine is still viable. The typical private annuity contract involves cash basis taxpayers and bare contract rights, a combination that remains open to an assertion that the contract is not equivalent to cash.
Theoretically, even if the promise of the obligor is held to have an ascertainable
value under Logan, there is still the possibility that the cash equivalence doctrine would dictate open transaction treatment.116
B URNET V. LOGAN AND

CASH EQUIVALENCE

There is obviously a great deal of overlap between the open transaction
theory of Logan and the cash equivalence doctrine. In fact, even though Logan
is rarely cited for its relevance to the latter, the decision contains the following
language: "The promise was in no proper sense equivalent to cash. It had no
ascertainable fair market value. The transaction was not a closed one." 117 One
can readily see the problem in distinguishing these two very similar concepts.
In the private annuity contract, for example, such factors as the transferability
of the obligation, the presence of security, and the financial status of the
obligor all reflect on the marketability of the obligation, and hence to the
extent of its equivalence to cash. Likewise, these factors are closely related to
the question of whether the obligation has an ascertainable fair market value." s
It is significant to note that these two concepts are nonetheless distinct, and
that neither of them is recognized in Revenue Ruling 69-74. It must be further
stressed that an application of one or both theories demands that the private
annuity be given open transaction treatment. On the simplest level, Revenue
Ruling 69-74 is deficient because of its failure to take account of any of the
factors heretofore mentioned: the marketability and transferability of the
115. 289 F.2d 20, 24 (5th Cir. 1961). Some of these are solvent obligor, unconditional debt,
assignability, marketability.
116. In a dissenting opinion of 212 Corporation, 70 T.C. 788 (1978), a case involving a
private annuity transaction, Judge Fay expresses this principle, noting that the obligation in
Warren Jones was not the equivalent of cash even though it had an ascertainable fair market
value. Of course, Judge Fay was referring to the holding of the Tax Court, and reaffirmed its
applicability for the Third Circuit in his dissent.
117. 283 U.S. 404,413 (1931).
118. Conversely, we have seen how the size of the discount value may affect the equivalence
of cash doctrine, yet plays no role in whether the fair market value is ascertainable.
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obligation, the existence or non-existence of security, the accounting method of
the annuitant, the solvency of the obligor. It is further suggested that Revenue
Ruling 69-74 would be erroneous even with a consideration of the above factors, since the private annuity contract, by its nature, should always yield open
transaction treatment to the annuitant.
Is the fair market value of the annuity promise any more ascertainable than
the value of the promise in Logan to make annual payments dependent upon
the amount of ore extracted from a mine? Are there not very similar estimates,
assumptions, and speculations in determining the life span of a single individual as there are in determining amounts of extracted ore? While considerations as to whether the obligor will be able to make the payments are important, the total amount of these payments, as determined solely by the life
of the transferor, would seem to be even more critical. A wealthy obligor who
provides adequate security may not have to make any payments at all; on the
other hand, he may have to pay a great deal more than he receives in return.
Youngstown Sheet and Tube Company, the obligor in Logan, was solvent. 1 9
That did not prevent the Supreme Court from affording open transaction treatment. In fact, the obligation was in all probability marketable, but this did not
sway the Court from its finding that the promise was in "no proper sense" the
equivalent of cash. 120 This fact was recognized by the dissenters in Bell who
intentionally overlooked the security element and asserted that a private annuity contract, because of the speculative nature of a person's life span, is a
right that is not readily transferable in commerce. The dissenters argued that
the security interest may have provided a basis for distinguishing Lloyd, but
that did not bar application of the cash equivalence doctrine. One of the more
recent private annuity cases, Fehrs Finance Company v. Commissioner,121
failed to utilize this rationale in holding that a private annuity contract did
not constitute a property distribution within the meaning of sections 301 and
317.122 While not expressly rejecting the more fundamental uncertainty expressed above, the courts failed to take advantage of an opportunity to minimize the security element present in Bell and apply the philosophy of Logan
more liberally.
With respect to the accrual basis taxpayer the deferral aspects of the private
annuity are somewhat more restricted. Although it is his right to receive income
and not his actual receipt that determines inclusion in gross income,= an
accrual method taxpayer is not required to report income when the "item in
question is uncollectible when the obligation therefore accrues, and there is
little or no likelihood of collection in the future."124 The possibility that a
119. This is evidenced by the large sums of money paid out. 283 U.S. 404, 410 (1951).
120. Id. at 415. This illustrates the problem of dosing transactions by assigning a fair
market value simply because there are buyers that will pay something for the obligation.
121. 58 T.C. 174 (1972), aff'd, 487 F.2d 184 (8th Cir. 1973).
122. Id. at 192, 487 F.2d at 189. In distinguishing Bell, the Tax Court and the circuit
court of appeals both cited the lack of security as well as the youth and limited financial resources of the relevant corporation as constituting an uncertainty over whether payment would
be made.
123. Spring City Foundry Co., 292 US. 182, 184 (1934),
124. George L. Castner, 30 T.C. 1061, 1069 (1958).
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purchaser or debtor may default is not sufficient to defer the accrual of income. 125 Other cases have stated that an accrual basis taxpayer need not report
income when there is "real doubt and uncertainty" that a claim for payment
126
will ever be turned into cash or its equivalent.
As discussed above, there are generally two reasons why a private annuity
transaction requires open transaction treatment - the uncertainty as to whether
the obligor will be able to make the payments and the uncertainty of the
annuitant's life expectancy. The former uncertainty may not be particularly
relevant to the accrual basis taxpayer, if the cited cases are controlling. Nevertheless, the latter uncertainty appears to be a viable argument for deferral of
income. One commentator suggests that the lack of reference in Revenue
Ruling 69-74 to the taxpayer's method of accounting may be "tacit recognition
of the applicability of Burnet v. Logan."'12 The implication is that if open
transaction treatment is required because of the speculative nature of the
annuitant's life span, then the method of accounting utilized by the annuitant
is irrelevant. To the extent the author suggests that the annuitant's method of
accounting may indeed be irrelevant, he may be correct. However, it cannot
realistically be argued that this fact was tacitly recognized by the Service.128
THE PRESENT VALUE OF AN ANNUITY PROMISE

If the presence of a gift element under Revenue Ruling 239 causes the
present value of the annuity promise to constitute the "investment in the con125. First Say. & Loan Ass'n, 40 T.C. 474, 487 (1963).
126. Western Oaks Bldg. Corp., 49 T.C. 365, 372 (1968). The difference in methods of
accounting was most clearly illustrated in Western Oaks since it involved both accrual and cash
basis petitioners. The decision dealt with a sale of homes involving the use of restricted savings
accounts. This arrangement was created to circumvent state laws maximizing the amounts savings and loan associations could lend to purchasers. The difference between the selling price of
the property and the sum of the cash down payment and the allowable loan to the buyer was
placed in savings accounts for the petitioners-sellers. However, the accounts were restricted in
that the petitioners could only withdraw certain amounts, dependent upon the payments made
by the purchasers. Rejecting the argument of the accrual basis taxpayer that it never received
an unrestricted passbook but only a contingent right to receive funds in the future, the Tax
Court held that the face amount of the restricted accounts were immediately includible in
gross income. With respect to the cash method petitioners, however, the court found that the
obligations did not readily pass from hand to hand in commerce, and therefore were taxable
only as amounts could be withdrawn.
127. Stewart, Private Annuities -Revenue Ruling 69-74 partially repudiated, sub silento
by Treas. Reg. §1.1011-2(c), example (8), 24 MmcERa L. REV. 585, 601 (1973).
128. One author asserts that Revenue Ruling 69-74 actually embraces open transaction
treatment. Kanter, Recent Tax Court Decisions Shed Further Light on Private Annuity
Transactions, 42 J. TAXATION 66 (1975). More specifically, he has chosen to embrace two
separate methods within the open transaction label, that of "cost recovery" and "deferred reporting." Deferred reporting, which is espoused in Rev. Rul. 69-74 as well as the dissenting
opinion of Bell, mandates that each cash payment partly constitutes a recovery of cost, partly
an interest factor, and partly gain. Both methods are different from the concept of a "closed"
transaction which describes a reporting method in which gain is computed immediately on the
basis of cash received and the fair market value of property received by a cash basis taxpayer.
It can easily be advanced that Revenue Ruling 69-74 required closed transaction treatment to
the extent it requires immediate recognition of the gain element.
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tract," the annuitant would obviously attempt to have the greatest value possible assigned to the promise so as to increase the excluded amount (as well as
decrease the gift tax paid). Under Revenue Ruling 69-74, however, the greater
the present value of the annuity promise, the greater the capital gains tax,
without the corresponding advantage of an increase in the investment in the
contract.12 '
It is important to note that the concept of present value is somewhat fleeting
in nature. It is totally dependent upon which annuity tables are used.130
Revenue Ruling 69-74 states that U. S. Life Table 38 contained in 20.2031-7 of
the Estate Tax Regulations was the appropriate table. The current estate and
gift tax tables which are applicable to transactions entered into after December
31, 1970, are contained in Regulation section 20.2031-10(f). The older tables are
based on an assumed return of 3 1/2 percent per year, while the present ones are
more realistically based on a 6 percent return. Furthermore, the present tables
take into consideration the difference in life expectancies between men and
women, as well as the general increase in life expectancies since the old tables
were promulgated.
When Revenue Ruling 62-136 is applicablel'8 the tables under Revenue
Ruling 62-137132 are utilized. These tables have been updated by Revenue
Ruling 72-438,133 which prescribes values less than those contained in Revenue
Ruling 62-137, yet still substantially greater than the present estate and gift
tax tables.
In Dix v. Commissioner," the transferors of a private annuity contract
attacked the use of the estate tax tables, 13 arguing that the private annuity
should be valued either according to what a commercial life insurance company
would have charged for a comparable contract or by using Treasury Regulation
section 1.72-9. The taxpayers, who had sold appreciated stocks transferred to
them in exchange for a private annuity contract, sought to obtain a higher value
assigned to the contract in order to receive a corresponding increase in the cost
basis of the stock. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, affirming the Tax
Court, upheld the validity of the estate tax tables, stating that the taxpayers
failed to prove their use by the Commissioner arbitrary and unreasonable. 86
129.

The transferee, however, still has an interest in increasing the present value of the

annuity promise, since the basis in the transferred property is determined by such value. I.R.C.
§1012. See Dix v. Commissioner, 392 F.2d 313 (4th Cir. 1968).

130. The present value of an annuity contract as evidenced by any actuarial tables is
based on three factors: the life expectancy of the annuitant, the discount rate, and the amount
of each periodic payment. The first two factors involve theoretical quantities which are in.
corporated into the annuity table; the amount of each payment is determined by the parties
to the transaction. The longer the life expectancy and the lower the discount rate, the greater
the present value of the annuity will be.
181. See notes 34-36 supra and accompanying text.
132. 1962-2 C.B. 28.
133. 1972-2 C.B. 38.
134. 392 F.2d 313 (4th Cir. 1968).
135. TREAS. RFG. §20.2031-7(f) (1954).
136. The "arbitrary" and "unreasonable" test was set forth in Koshland's Estate v. Commissioner, 177 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1949). Accord, 212 Corporation, 70 T.C. 788 (1978); Estate of
Lloyd G. Bell, 60 T.C. 469 (1973). Theoretically, a taxpayer in excellent health should be able
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The Dix court distinguished commercial tables issued by life insurance companies because of the following factors, all of which increase the cost of the
contract: (1) the commercial companies are regulated by the state and are subject to restrictions on their investments as well as being required to maintain
reserves; (2) their prices include a loading factor which takes into consideration profit and expenses; (3) actuarial experience shows that purchasers of commercial annuity contracts have significantly longer life expectancies than the
general population; and (4) the commercial companies almost invariably have
greater assets than private individuals.
Although the life expectancies provided by Treasury Regulation §1.72-9 are
essential to a computation of the expected return, and hence the exclusion ratio
of the annuity payments, the present values of annuity contracts as set forth in
the estate tax tables incorporate shorter life expectancies. 13 This fact was recognized by the taxpayer in Dix who urged that the section 72 regulations should
be employed. Despite the apparent incongruity, the Dix court rejected the use
of Treasury Regulation §1.72-9, holding:
The evidence indicates that Treas. Reg. §1.72-9, Table I is a table of
life expectancies of persons who have purchased annuity contracts from
commercial insurance companies. It is used in determining the portion
of the annuity payment which the annuitant may exclude from gross income in instances where the expected return is based on the annuitant's
life expectancy. The estate and gift tax tables are not based merely on
life expectancy; they are mortality tables with a built-in discount factor,
and their purpose is to value private annuity contracts rather than
estimate the annuitant's life expectancy.138
It is contended that there are two problems with this analysis: (1) the
estate tax tables do in fact estimate life expectancy. This estimate may be obtained merely by removing the discount factor from the stated values;13 9 and (2)
accepting the fact that purchasers of commercial annuities have longer life
expectancies, it is both inconsistent and unreasonable to compute the exclusion
ratio - which decreases as the assumed life expectancy increases - on the basis
of one projected life expectancy and yet simultaneously use a smaller life expectancy to value the annuity.
to avoid the use of this table because its actuarial assumptions are based on the population as
a whole. Where the health of an annuitant is so poor that the normal life expectancy is
severely shortened, some courts have allowed the valuation to be made by reference to the
actuarial life expectancy of the particular annuitant. See, e.g., Estate of John P. Hoelzel, 28
T.C. 384 (1957); Estate of N. M. Butler, 18 T.C. 914 (1952).
137. This fact may be ascertained by comparing Table B of TREAS. REG. §20.2031-10
which is concerned with annuities for a life span. The risks of non-payment for any other
reason are not considered in Table B and there is no reason to assume they are considered in
Tables A(1) and A(2). This is another reason why in an arm's length transaction the fair
market value of the transferred property (as used in Davis) is a better standard for valuing the
fair market value of the annuity. The present value table not only assumes a rate of interest
that is not reflective of the times, and fails to take account of the particular life expectancy of
the annuitant, but it also does not take into consideration any other factors which may be
vital to assigning a fair market value to the annuity.
138. Dix v. Commissioner, 392 F.2d 313, 316 (4th Cir. 1968).
139. See note 137 supra.
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THE VARLkBLE ANNurrY

The uncertainties which characterize the private annuity transaction provide great justification for those arguments made by taxpayers who desire deferred reporting of gain. An interesting problem which complicates this area by
adding yet another uncertainty to the transfer of annuity contracts is the
variable annuity.
There is no problem in computing the expected return (and hence, the
exclusion ratio) when the periodic payment is fixed. But what about the variable annuity, i.e., an annuity in which the periodic payments are tied to some
contingent factor which causes the payments to vary from year to year. While
this is a much rarer arrangement than the fixed income annuity, it is becoming
increasingly popular in this inflationary economy. Commercial insurers, in
order to compete with banks and trust companies, began to invest portions of
their portfolios in equities, and allowed the purchasers of annuities to share in
the investment experience. To the knowledgeable and less conservative annuitant, who recognized the inability of the fixed income annuity to "keep up"
with inflation, this provided a realistic alternative. They are presently a common characteristic of employee annuities within the context of deferred compensation plans.
The standard variable annuity involves the purchase of "accumulation
units" which represent shares in a flexible investment portfolio. The periodic
payments are based upon the number and value of the units which in turn depend upon the investment experience of the portfolio.1 40 Despite its preponderance in the commercial context, the variable annuity is a viable alternative to the fixed income annuity device in the private annuity area.14 '
The foreclosure of the application of Logan with respect to the fixed income annuity was a Congressional mandate that did little damage to the concept of open transaction treatment. After all, only one of the two factors necessary to compute the "expected return" required resort to the actuarial tables.
At least, the "expected return" is a concept that evidences some reasonableness
in the context of a fixed income annuity. However, the additional factor present
in the variable annuity would apparently preclude the application of section
140. For a more detailed discussion of this arrangement, see Vernava, Tax Planning for
the Not-So-Rich: Variable and Private Annuities, 11 Wms. & MARY L. REv. 1 (1969).
141. For example, it would not be unusual to transfer property in exchange for variable
annual payments based on the gross receipts of the transferee's sole proprietorship. Problems
could arise in this situation, however, and one would have to ensure that the partnership tax
provisions were not applicable. Even more important, the transferor-annuitant should make
certain he is not considered to have retained a life estate. To accomplish this he should avoid
"tying" the payments to the income earned on the transferred property. The Service would
most likely not consider the annuitant to have retained a life estate when the annuity payments are substantially similar to the income earned from the property unless there is no
personal liability on the transferee outside of the income earned by the property, the annuitant has not relinquished complete ownership of the property, or the annuity payments are
in fact limited to the income from the property. These considerations are also important to the
fixed income annuity, although the variable annuity seems more inherently subject to abuse.
If the annuitant has transferred the property to a trust, these factors are also important in
avoiding the application of the grantor trust provisions. See note 83 supra.
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72, and instead mandate open transaction treatment. Nonetheless, the Treasury
has devised a method by which the variable annuity can be taxed within the
framework of section 72.142 Generally, the investment in the contract is considered to be equal to the expected return and the resulting exclusion ratio of
one hundred percent is applied to all amounts received as an annuity under the
contract. To ascertain the "amounts received as an annuity" this investment in
the contract must be divided by the life expectancy of the annuitant. Payments
are "amounts received as an annuity" to the extent they do not exceed the
quotient, and hence are excludable from gross income as a return of premiums
or other consideration. To the extent the payment exceeds this amount it is
considered to be an amount not received as an annuity, and is fully includible
in gross income.'" If the annuitant receives less than that amount which he is
entitled to exclude, he may elect to recompute the "amounts received as an
annuity" in a succeeding year by adding the deficit to his investment in the
contract 44 and redetermining his life expectancy as of the succeeding year. 145
The treatment thus afforded the recipient of a variable annuity is hybrid in
nature. That the life expectancy tables are utilized to give a pro rata approach
is evidence of the impact of section 72. The yearly allocation of the pro rata
investment as a recovery of capital is homage to the Logan rule. A glaring conceptual problem is apparent. If the value of a contingent obligation is unascertainable under the Logan rationale, why should the fact that it is payable
in the form of an annuity change the result? The Service would contend that
section 72 does in fact accomplish this. It is submitted here that section 72
changes the result only to the extent it prevents the uncertainty of the annuitant's life span from dictating open transaction treatment, and has no
relevance to the uncertainty of the actual payments. The regulations permit a
great distortion of the literal meaning of the phrase "expected return," and are
equally problematic in their acceptance of a fluctuating "investment in the
contract."
CONCLUSION

Applying the principles of the private annuity cases and Revenue Ruling
239 to the 1954 Code afforded very favorable tax treatment to the transferor of
appreciated property146 in exchange for a private annuity contract. The Service
142. TREAs. REG. §1.72-2(b)(3), T.D. 6885, 1966-2 C.B. 307; TREAs. REG. §1.72-4(d)(3), T.
7352, 1975-1 C.B. 34.
143. TREAs. RaE. §1.72.4(a)(ii) (1970).
144. This is inconsistent with the intention of §72 that the "investment in the contract"
be constant over the annuity period, and provides further ammunition for an attack on the
validity of these regulations. See notes 72-74 supra and accompanying text.
145. The case law does not reflect any attack on the validity of these regulations. The
government would undoubtedly argue that the legislative power given the Secretary in
§72(c)(3)(A) gives more weight to the regulations. However, §72(c)(3) is concerned with "expected return," not §72(c)(3)(A) which only empowers the Secretary to prescribe actuarial
tables with respect to life expectancy. It can be argued that Congress did not contemplate the
additional variable present in variable annuities when it enacted §72.
146. Revenue Ruling 69-74 is only applicable to transfers of appreciated property for
private annuity contracts. While transfers of depreciated property do not come within the

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1978

31

Florida Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 1 [1978], Art. 7

1978]

REVENUE RULING 69-74:

realized that a modification of its position would probably not withstand the
case authority and fundamental tax principles that existed in 1954. Such modification was certainly not supportable merely because of the enactment of section 72, a fact apparently recognized by the Service when it fought for specific
private annuity legislation in 1954. The Service was unsuccessful in its efforts
and the proposed section 1241147 was never enacted.
Section 1241 contained some very significant changes with respect to the
transferor's income tax treatment. It provided that the annuity contract was to
be valued at the time of the exchange by reference to the amount charged by
life insurance companies for a similar annuity contract. The financial condition of the obligor was not to affect the value of the contract and such value
ambit of the ruling, perhaps the rationale of Revenue Ruling 69-74 should be equally applicable. Generally, the question has been resolved by disallowing the loss deduction since the
exchange has been determined to be one not entered into for profit. See, e.g., Evans v.
Rothensies, 114 F.2d 958 (3rd Cir. 1940). Strictly speaking, the primary purpose of the private
annuity transaction has many of the elements of a commercial venture which qualifies for such
loss treatment. The private annuity does suppose the imposition of interest, for example, and
the motives of security and having a regular income are present in many commercial transactions which are considered as having been entered into for profit. See Goldberg, Annuities, A
ComparativeAnalysis: Intra-Florida,College-Type, Commercial,N.Y.U. 22ND INST. ON FED. TAX
1213 (1964). Furthermore, this treatment is inconsistent with Revenue Ruling 69-74, which
implicitly treats the transaction as one entered into for profit by continuing to tax the gain
element after the total capital gain has been reported at the conclusion of the term certain
with Tables A(l) and A(2) which deal with life annuities. Table B gives an annuity factor
based on the number of years the annuity payments will be made with an assumed rate of
interest at 6%. The annuity factor is simply multiplied by the amount of the periodic payments to obtain the present value of the annuity. That the present value of the annuity is
based only on the assumed interest rate and no other factors (such as the risk of the obligor
becoming insolvent) can be easily calculated by selecting a random term of years and annual
payment. One can simply multiply the present value derived from the table by 6% to get the
assumed interest each year, and then reduce the sum of the principal and interest by the
annual payment. These computations are ample proof that the discount value is the only
consideration (besides the annuity payment itself) that is relevant to the Table B present
values. One can then refer to TREAs. RF. §1.72-9 to find the age of an individual who has the
same life expectancy as the number of years chosen above. Theoretically, the present value of
an annuity owned by him should equal the present value of an annuity with such fixed term.
Yet we find that the present values are substantially disparate. The problem is that for purposes of TREAs. REG. §20.2031-10, the annuitant's life expectancy is much less. There are simply
no other factors which can explain the difference. The projected life expectancy assigned to
the annuitant reflects all those risks that relate to the uncertainty of the annuitants life expectancy term. Another reason why the loss deduction is denied at the time of exchange is the
fact that the obligor's promise cannot be valued. While this rationale is logically sound, it is
still inconsistent with Revenue Ruling 69-74, which incorrectly recognizes an "indeterminable"
gain ratably over the annuitant's life expectancy. Turning the tables on the Service, the annuitant might wish to attempt to recognize his loss pro rata per Revenue Ruling 69-74, as well
as using his adjusted basis in the property as his investment in the contract in order to get a
larger exclusion ratio. Still another justification for disallowing the loss are the provisions in
§267 of the Code. The other situation in which a loss deduction could be obtained is when the
annuitant dies before recovering his basis in the transferred property. This deduction has been
denied because the annuitant has gotten exactly what he bargained for, that is, payments for
the remainder of his life. A criticism of this approach is found in Note, note 59 supra, at 692.
See also, Industrial Trust Co. v. Broderick, 94 F.2d 927 (Ist Cir. 1938).
147. See H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83rd. Cong., 2d Sess. 263 (1954).
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would be treated as an amount realized so as to trigger immediate recognition
of gain. 148 Consistently, the present value of the annuity contract was to be
used as the investment in the contract under section 72. Thus, it seems clear
that the Service attempted to do administratively in Revenue Ruling 69-74
what it could not do by legislation, at least insofar as denying open transaction
treatment. Any argument against the validity of Revenue Ruling 69-74 should
include a citation of the statute that was never enacted - section 1241.141
Logan is still as viable today as it was fifteen years ago. The cash equivalence
doctrine is similarly alive and well, although the Fifth and Ninth Circuits have
narrowed its application substantially. The rationale that characterized the line
of private annuity cases beginning with Lloyd and Kann's Estate has not been
eroded. Bell has reinforced the apprehension of all but the most optimistic of
commentators that a security feature will counteract Logan and cause the immediate recognition of gain. The application of Revenue Ruling 62-136,50
may have the same effect if it has not been impliedly revoked by Revenue
Ruling 69-74. A more realistic approach would afford the same treatment to
those institutions which do not fall within the literal terms of Revenue Ruling
62-136, yet which come within the spirit of the promulgation.
It can be predicted that all of these considerations will lose their significance once the courts recognize that it is the particularly speculative nature of
a private annuity, even if adequately secured, which mandates open transaction
treatment. This result can be reached by either a more liberal reading of Logan
or a stricter application of the doctrine of cash equivalence. Admittedly, these
developments would be somewhat revolutionary, but even the traditional concepts discussed above compel rejection of Revenue Ruling 69-74 to the extent
that it requires the recognition of gain before the entire capital is recovered.
Still, this position does the taxpayer little good if the Service's contention
that the adjusted basis of the contract is equal the investment in the contract
(for purposes of section 72) is upheld. 151 While 212 Corporationmay appear to
sound the death knell for the Service's position, the unusual circumstances
surrounding the court's holding mitigate much of its precedential value. The
Commissioner's action provides little evidence that he will repudiate the position taken in Revenue Ruling 69-74. It appears that the issue will be resolved
judicially only if there is a direct controversy between the taxpayer and the
Commissioner on this very issue, so that all of the complex arguments may be
considered. 152 Clearly, the factual setting which would most likely compel such
148. Id. The House Report stated that this treatment constituted a reversal of previous
decisions including Logan.
149. It should be noted that a similar attempt at legislative change was made in 1963 again
with the purpose of closing the transaction at the time of the transfer. At the time the legislation was proposed the Treasury Department admitted that the present state of law required
the application of open transaction theory. Nothing has changed since 1963 except the collective mind of the Service.
150. See notes 32-36 supra and accompanying text.
151. See note 66 supra.
152. For example, it has also been asserted that Revenue Ruling 69-74 has been repudiated
by TREAS. REG. §1.1011-2(c), Example (8) (1972) in that the appreciation gain is part of the
annuitant's investment in the contract. See Stewart, note 126 supra. The regulation, which
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a confrontation would involve an unsecured rather than a secured private annuity.
If Logan is truly applicable to the private annuity transaction, there can be
no utilization of the Davis principle, even for the limited purpose described
above.15 Revenue Ruling 239 acknowledged the relevance of Logan to the
extent that it allows the annuitant to recover his basis in the transferred property before he is required to recognize gain. Still, Logan does more than identify
the point at which the transferor begins to recognize gain, i.e., when his basis is
fully recovered. It also tells us that the subsequent amounts continue to be
taxed as gain from a sale or exchange until the transaction is closed. That

Logan speaks to both the timing and amount of gain stems from its ultimate
holding that in some instances the fair market value of property received simply
cannot be valued. Analyzed from this perspective, Revenue Ruling 239 undermines the Logan doctrine as much as Revenue Ruling 69-74 does. Revenue
Ruling 69-74 tacitly rejects Logan's applicability to the private annuity transaction.15 4 On the other hand, Revenue Ruling 239 properly recognizes Logan's
applicability by deferring the recognition of gain, yet only takes into consideration one element of open transaction treatment. In theory, Revenue Ruling 239
is permeated with internal inconsistency. Logan can only provide a "bottom"
for taxing gain - it cannot establish a ceiling.
Logan cannot be avoided by considering those payments made after the
annuitant has outlived his life expectancy, i.e., after the annuitant has recovered the fair market value of the transferred property, as due to the annuitant's longevity rather than to a sale of the property.15 5 Every payment the
annuitant receives is due to his longevity and yet there is no argument that in
the early years taxation of the gain element is barred by the exclusion ratio of
section 72. There is no justification for treating the transaction as reverting
back to pure annuity status at the point the annuitant reaches his actuarial life
expectancy. The annuitant has bargained for the right to receive payments for
the rest of his life, not just to the time he reaches his actuarial life expectancy.
It is also no answer to assert that the property could have been sold for cash
and the proceeds invested in the private annuity. It is true that in that case the
annuitant would be in the same economic position with a maximum taxable
gain equal to the difference between the amount of cash realized, usually equal
to the present value of the annuity, and the adjusted basis of the transferred
deals with bargain sales to charities in exchange for private annuities, states that the present
value of the annuity- the fair market value of the transferred property in an arm's length
transaction - is equal to the investment in the contract. While a regulation may have the effect
of nullifying a contrary revenue ruling it is unlikely this was a conscious revocation of Revenue
Ruling 69-74. See Stewart, note 126 supra at 614. Perhaps the Service will argue that the
regulation should be limited to exempt organizations such as churches (used in all eight examples) but the justification for this is difficult to see. The unusual aspect of the example is
that there was really no reason to discuss such concepts as the exclusion ratio, investment in
the contract, or expected return in a regulation apparently drafted to address the assignment
of bases in part sale, part gift transactions.
153. See text accompanying notes 44-45 supra.
154. See text accompanying notes 51-52 supra.
155. See note 56 supra.
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property. But the fact remains that that is not what the annuitant did. Such
action would generally counteract one of the principal motivations behind the
private annuity arrangement, the keeping of transferred property within the
family unit. Furthermore, the sale-purchase approach would also require immediate taxation of the gain, while the transaction contemplated by Revenue
Ruling 239 properly allows deferral of the gain element.
Thus, a substantial danger must be confronted by those who desire to
attack the validity of Revenue Ruling 69-74. Despite the impropriety of the
ruling, a "victorious" petitioner may not receive the benefit of Revenue Ruling
239 as the alternative tax treatment. The tax advantage afforded by the deferred
reporting of gain that characterizes open transaction treatment may be offset by
a stricter application of Logan which, unlike Revenue Ruling 69-74, allows no
ceiling on the amount of capital gain reportable. It is also possible that the
courts could utilize the Revenue Ruling 69-74 exclusion ratio solely because of
their adoption of the open transaction treatment afforded by Revenue Ruling
239. In sum, although the Service may be patently wrong in denying open
transaction treatment, a recognition of its applicability does not guarantee the
taxpayer favorable income tax treatment. It is suggested here that the existence of security, a condition that was previously feared as dosing the transaction, must be considered as a viable alternative to the treatment afforded by
Revenue Ruling 69-74. The corresponding income tax liabilities that result
from closed or open transaction treatment should be carefully scrutinized. 50
To eliminate the vagaries of the Logan and cash equivalence doctrines the
following proposal is made: the Service could retract Revenue Ruling 69-74,
substituting in its stead a ruling which reflects the true income tax consequences of open transaction treatment. The taxpayer, however, could be given
an election at the time of the exchange to treat the transaction as open or
dosed. Pure open transaction treatment, although not as favorable as that obtained under Revenue Ruling 239, would at least be in accord with fundamental tax principles, and would avoid the artificiality that characterizes
Revenue Ruling 69-74. If the annuitant chose to have dosed transaction treatment, he would immediately report gain on the difference between the adjusted basis of the transferred property and either the fair market value of the
transferred property or the present value of the annuity promise, depending
upon the adequacy of the consideration given. 57 The tax result would be conceptually proper and the Service would obtain the immediate revenue that results from closing the transaction. 158 The taxability of the subsequent payments

156. For example, a taxpayer with little taxable income or with offsetting losses in the
current year would prefer to be taxed in the year of the transaction. A taxpayer would also
consider the possibility of employing §453 in his determination whether to close the transaction.
157. See note 58 and accompanying text supra.
158. Of course, one could then elect the §453 installment reporting with the fair market
value of the transferred property or the present value of the annuity promise constituting the
total contract price.
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could then depend upon the rules of section 72. Once it is recognized that the
proper consequences of open transaction treatment may not be afforded by
Revenue Ruling 239, the option offered by this proposal appears reasonable.
ELIOT WEITZMAN

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol31/iss1/7

36

Weitzman: Revenue Ruling 69-74: An Administrative Reversal of Burnet v. Log

HOW TO TRY A FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASE
BY

Two Volumes

PAUL C. MATTHEWS
Of the Illinois and North Dakota Bars
Professor of Law, University of Arizona

With pocket part
supplements
$50.00

Step by step procedure in logical sequence, beginning with the initial arrest
and ending with pardons, paroles and commutation.
Defending
Prosecuting
0 What to do-How to do it
* Modern-Comprehensive
With forms for every stage of the trial
Including Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
DENNIS & CO., INC.
Law Book Publishers
251 Main Street
Buffalo, New York 14203
Date

Please send me MATTHEWS-HOW TO TRY A FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASE,
2 Volumes at the Special Introductory Price of $50.00 with 1972 Supplement.
NAME
Address
City

Zone

0 Check Enclosed

0 Send C.O.D.

State

0 Charge my account

Coming in the Next Issue...
Onshore Impact of Offshore Energy Development: A Florida Perspective
Florida's "Reasonable Beneficial" Water Use Standard: Have East and
West Met?
Discovery in the IRS Summons Enforcement Proceeding: Less Certain Than
Death and Taxes
The Brady Doctrine in Florida
Burdens of Persuasion in Criminal Proceedings: The Reasonable Doubt
Standard After Patterson v. New York
Book Review: Counsel for the United States: U.S. Attorneys in the Political
and Legal Systems by James Eisenstein.

University of Florida Law Review
COLLEGE OF LAW, HOLLAND LAW CENTER -GAINESVILLE,

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1978

FL 32611

37

